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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
By
Belayneh Kassa Anagaw
In this paper, we investigated three different distinct issues related to Regional
Trade Agreements(RTAs) in three separate chapters.
In the first chapter, we investigates the impact of formation of free-trade areas
(FTAs) on the use of contingent protection between competing exporters. We
develop a dynamic model similar to the competing-importers one of Tabakis
(2015), in which countries are limited to self-enforcing cooperative multilateral
trade agreements and the economic environment is characterized by trade-flow
volatility. Our analysis demonstrates that the findings of Tabakis (2015) extend
to our competing-exporters case. In particular, the parallel formation of differ-
ent FTAs results countries to cooperate multilaterally and hence, a gradual but
permanent easing of multilateral trade tensions, especially as far as contingent
protection is concerned. Thus, our results highlights formation of FTAs has a
building-block effect on multilateral trade cooperation.
In the second chapter, we analyze the impact of historical conflict on duration
of trade negotiation. The world has witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of
regional trade agreements (RTAs) since the early 1990s, which has prompted a
heated debate among trade economists and policymakers about the implications
of RTAs for the multilateral trading system. Besides the standard economic gains
from regional integration, RTAs can produce significant political gains for their
i
member countries, chief among which is the reduction in interstate conflict be-
tween RTA members (peace-creation effect). Thus, depending on the RTA in
question, economic integration and peace solidification can both occupy center
stage on the agenda of the prospective RTA partners during the trade negotia-
tions, affecting their duration. It is well known that the duration of negotiations
across RTAs differs substantially, but this phenomenon has not received much
attention in the literature. In this paper, we explore for the first time the legacy
of past conflict on RTA negotiations. Using a unique dataset on the history of
formation of a large number of RTAs (Tabakis and Zanardi, 2018) as well as data
on conflict from the Correlates of War project and by employing survival anal-
ysis techniques, we found that country pairs with history of conflict conclude
their trade negotiations relatively faster—1.5 to 2.2 times faster in comparison
with country pairs with no history of conflict. The result has implications for
firms’ investment decision and the role of politics in RTAs negotiation.
Finally in chapter three, we estimate the role of developing countries exposure
to more advanced countries, proxied by regional trade agreement with high in-
come country, in improving the use of improved manufactured inputs for agri-
cultural production such as fertilizer and agricultural machinery. Using pooled
OLS with country and year fixed effects and alternative instrumental variable,
we found that having RTAs with high income countries is associated with higher
consumption of fertilizers relative to those who don’t have—about 10 percent
higher. Similar result is observed for the use agricultural machinery per 100
square kilometer; relative to those countries who do not have RTA with high in-
come countries, those countries who have such RTA uses higher number, which
is more than twice, of agricultural machineries.
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CHAPTER 1. FREE-TRADE AREAS AND CONTINGENT
PROTECTION BETWEEN COMPETING
EXPORTERS
1.1 Introduction
There is ongoing theoretical debate among economists about the impact of RTAs
on the realization of multilateral trade liberalization. The first group of economists
argues that Regional trade agreements can be a building block for the realization
of multilateral trade liberalization. While others argue RTAs as a tumbling block
for multilateral cooperation.
For example Summers (1991) emphasize the positive role of preferential trade
agreements on the facilitation of multilateral trade negotiations. Similarly, by
addressing the static and dynamic consequence issues identified by Bhagwati
(1993) and Ornels (2004) by using an oligopolistic-political-economy model ar-
gued the role FTAs in reducing obstacles to multilateral trade liberalization, thus
helping as a building block for global free trade.
On the other hand, there is a theoretical justification where Regional trade agree-
ments (RTAs) can be “Stumbling block” for multilateral negotiations due to pos-
sibility that such agreements can generate static welfare gains. Under such cir-
cumstance RTAs will reduce the incentives to extend trade liberalization. In his
‘dynamic path model’ Krugman (1993) cited in Aghion et.al (2006), showed
how regionalism affects multilateralism.
The other theoretical paper by Krishna (1998) showed that PTAs creates disin-
centive for multilateral trade liberalization. Using a model of imperfect compe-
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tition in different segmented markets, Krishna posited two conclusions: prefer-
ential trade arrangements that results trade diversion are more likely to be sup-
ported politically and hence, such PTAs will reduce incentive for multilateral
liberalization. Aghion et. al (2006) developed a dynamic bargaining model and
showed possibilities of stambling block and building blocks effects of FTAs on
Multilateral cooperation.
Bagwell and Saiger (1996) modeled the implication of customs-union formation
on multilateral tariff cooperation and showed early formation of customs-union
can lead to a temporary easing of multilateral trade tentions at the early stages
of its formation. But once the process of customs union is completed, the mar-
ket power consequence becomes real and there will be an incentive to deviate to
higher tariff. The intuition is formation of customs union creates trade diversion
effect and market power effect. Thus their model shows the relative importance
of market power effect to trade diversion effect that ultimately resulted a pre-
diction where the positive impact of custom union formation is just temporary
which will have a negative consequence on multilateral tariff cooperation once
the process of custom union formation has completed.
On a similar work Bagwell and Staiger (1997), has modeled the consequence
of the formation of regional trade agreements on the ability to maintain effec-
tive multilateral cooperation. Their model predicted that from the conception to
the process of formation of the regional agreements, the impact on the ability of
multilateral cooperation is negative. However, their model suggests that the neg-
ative impact on multilateral tariff cooperation is temporary. Once the regional
trade agreement process is completed, the greater multilateral cooperation will
be restored.
Existed theoretical literatures such as Tabakis (2015) by developing import com-
peting model, showed parallel formation of FTAs leads to gradual and permanent
ease of multilateral trade tension. This paper investigates the impact of FTAs on
multilateral cooperation by looking in to the competing exporters model which
2
is an extension of the import copmeting model by looking the export side and
is differentiated from the competing exporters model of Bagwell et al.(1999) by
considering export volatility in the model.
1.2 The Model
We assume four-country four good world where each importing country has three
countries competing to export for a specific good. Suppose the four countries
are, X, Y,W and Z, and the associated goods that are produced and exchanged in
the international market are x, y, w and z. At any period , country i’s endowment
of good i and j is 1-e and 1 + e
3
respectively; where j and i ∈ (x, y, w, z), i ̸= j
and The variable e, that we use to capture trade flow volatility is a random num-
ber which is drawn independently from a uniform distribution on [0,1]. Country
i is the only importer of good i for i ̸= j and i and j ϵ{x,y,w,z}. on the con-
sumption side, we assume all countries face symmetric demand functions where
the demand for product i in country j is given by C(P ji ) = α − βP ji where the
constant β is positive and α > 4 ; P ji is price of good i in country j. our model
follows from Tabakis(2015) that ephasizes imports three goods but exports one
good (an import competing model).
In this Paper we tried to see the export competing model which is a compliment
for what Tabakis(2015) investigate where the later focus on the import compet-
ing model. as in Tabakis(2015) , in this model we assume two trading blocs;
country X and Y form FTA in one side and W and Z form an FTA in another
FTA blocs. Country i imports good i from country j, hence country i’s import of
good i from j is equal to country j’ s export of good i. Thus, country i’s import
demand for good i from country j is given by (1 + e
3
)−C(P ji ) which is exactly
country j’s export of good i. And we keep assuming countries encounter com-
mon exogenous shock every period that is a function of e as in Tabakis, (2015).
Following Tabakis(2015) and Bagwell and Staiger(1997a), we assume three phases;
3
Phase I with no any kind of FTA between countries, but with future possibility
of FTA among prospective country pairs, Phase II where trade negotiation held
between X and Y in one bloc , W and Z in another bloc, finally phase III , two
symmetric FTA in the world. Moreover, each country follows the MFN princi-
ples for non-discriminatory tariff. In addition, we assume also if FTA negotiation
is not yet started, there is a probability that the FTA between X and Y in one side
W and Z in another side will start in next period with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Fi-
nally, we assume that the trade talk started at time t between country pairs will
be concluded and be in effect in t+1 with probability λ ∈ [0, 1].
1.3 Phase III
Phase III is where two countries , X and Y, form FTA in one bloc and W and Z
in another bloc; and it is in effect; Thus, our analysis begins with such symetric
world.
1.3.1 Phase III-Static Game
Prices
PXX = P
Y
X ;P
X
X = P
W
X + τ
X (1.1)
PWW = P
X
W + τ
W (1.2)
PXX refers the price of product X in country X and τX and τW country import
tariff of country X and country W respectively. The market clearing price for
good i requires the world demand to be equal to the world supply.
4
1− e+ 3(1 + e
3
) = CXX + C
Y
X + C
W
X + C
Z
X = 4α− βPXX − βP YX − βPWX − βPZX
= 4α− 4βPXX + β
(
τX + τX
)⇒ 4 = 4α− 4βPXX + β (τX + τX)
⇒ PXX =
4α− 4 + 2βτX
4β
=
α− 1
β
+
τX
2
= P YX .........................................................(3)
Therefore:
PWX =
α−1
β
− τX
2
In our case country X imports good x from three countries, Y, W and Z. But
the tariff with country Y is zero (FTA). We assume that the tariff that is chosen by
each country is non-negative and non-prohibitive for any bilateral tradeT Thus,
the price set for a give product has the following arbitrage condition .
PXX = P
Y
X = P
W
X + τ
X = PZX + τ
X ...............(4)
Country X’s Import function is thus expressed as; MXW = (1 + e3) − (α −
β
(
PWX
)
)
= e
3
− βτX
2
..........................................(5) similar for X’s import from Z
Equation (5) clearly shows that countries’ import is negatively related by the
tariff imposed by imported country. Therefore, country X’s welfare is defined
as the sum of surplus received from the consumption of four goods, surplus
received from the production of the four goods and the tariff revenue from import
of X from country W and Z
WX3 =
∫ α/β
PXX
C (P ) dP +
∫ α/β
PXY
C (P ) dP +
∫ α/β
PXW
C (P ) dP +
∫ α/β
PXZ
C (P ) dP
+
∫ PXX
0
(1− e) dP +
∫ PXY
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP +
∫ PXW
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP +
∫ PXZ
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP
+τXMXW + τ
XMXZ ..............................................(6)
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Using equation (6), we can derive the optimal tariff for country X,
∂WX3
∂τX
= e
6
− 7
4
βτX ........(7)
This imply that WX3 is strictly concave in τX and the best response tariff for
X eqaul:
τNX =
2e
21β
.......................................(8)
Since country X and country Y faces similar situation they have symmetric Nash
tariff. That is the best response tariff for country Y equal:
τNY =
2e
21β
Note that the global efficient tariff is , ∂W3(e,τ⃗)
∂τ
= −2βτ implying that the
Nash tariff choosen by each country is not efficient. Hence countries can make
better off if they cooperativly choose their tariff. To give intuitive explanation,
a tariff by importing country on exporting country worsens exporting countries’
terms of trade and hence welfare. Though the importing country is better off
in terms of generating tariff revenue, its welfare will be negatively affected by
tariffs on its export. The implication is that our static game is feature of the
prisoners dilemma. Hence, countries can do better if they cooperate
1.3.2 Phase III- Dynamic Game
Now we consider the dynamics of the game by taking into account the infinitely
repeated game case where countries interact in the future course of action. We
assume at the start of the period, countries are informed about the possibility of
FTA formation between two countries in one bloc and other two in another bloc
and its implication on trade volume. Then they simultaneously choose their cur-
rent –period tariff which comes with its own payoffs. When countries choose
6
their current period tariff, the chosen tariff must be self-enforcing. More pre-
cisely, for a given value of e, a one-time deviation from the cooperative tariff
must not exceed the discounted future benefit of cooperation. To develop it
mathematically for the trade gains from one time devation that comes due to
trade volume;
dΩ(e,τNx ,τ
c
x,τ
c
−x)
de
=
∂Wx3 (e,τ
N
x ,τ
c
x,τ
c
−x)
∂e
−∂Wx3 (e,τcx,τcx,τc−x)
∂e
= 1
6
[τNx −τ cx].....................(9)
dΩ(e,τNx ,τ
C
x ,τ
c
−x)
dτcx
=
∂Wx3 (e,τ
N
x ,τ
c
x,τ
c
−x)
∂τc−x
− ∂Wx3 (e,τcx,τcx,τcx)
∂τcx
= −[1
6
τNx − 7β4 τ cx]......(10)
Using the Envelope theorem, dΩ(e,τ
N
x ,τ
c
x,τ
c
−x)
de
> 0 and dΩ(e,τ
N
x ,τ
c
x,τ
c
−x)
dτcx
< 0 this
is true if and only if τCx < 2e21β = τ
N
x . In other words if the cooperative tariff
is set to the Nash tariff, there is no incentive to cheat. In general the static gain
from defection is given by :
Ω(τNx , τ
c
x, τ
c
−x) = W
X
3 (τ
N
x , τ
c
−x)−WX3 (τ cx, τ c−x)
Ω(τNx , τ
c
x, τ
c
−x) =
7b
8
[(τ cx)
2 − (τNx )2] + e6 [τNx − τ cx]...................................(11)
Equation(11) has important implication about the chanel through which the
deviation from the cooperative tariff has ; change through the consumer and
producer surplus and gain from tariff revenue. The first term from the RHS of
equation (11) shows the loss of consumer and producer surplus from consump-
tion and production distorion effect of tariff increase respectively.
However, any temptation to cheat has a risk of trade war which eventually lead
for infinite reversion to the non-cooperative equilibrium , the Nash tariff, Grim
trigger strategy for the infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma.
Thus when countries attempt to deviate from the cooperative tariff, they compare
the static gain from defection with the future discounted value of cooperation.
suppose all countries value the future equally and let each country’s discount fac-
7
tor between periods be δ ∈ [0, 1) and E be the expectation operator, expectations
over the distribution of e. Then the present discounted value of the expected fu-
ture gains from multilateral cooperation today is given as:
δ
1−δ [EW
x(e, τCx , τ
C
−x)−EW x(e, τNx , τN−x)].......................................................(12)
ω = δ
1−δ
1
1323
[
2
(√
126βω
)3 − 6 (126βω) + 6√126βω] .................(13)
Following the approach of Tabakis (2015) and Bagwell and Staiger(1990),
we initially fix ω at an arbitrary non- negative value and solve the smallest pos-
sible non negative cooperative tariff as well as the threshold volume of trade.
Thus, fixing ω¯ > 0 and solving for e¯
ω ≡ WX(e¯1, τNX (e¯), 0)−WX(e¯, 0, 0) = e
2
126β
Solving for e¯1 =
√
126βω..............................(14)
The value on equation (14)is the threshold volume of trade through which
free cooperative tariff is maintained. Thus, the most cooperative tariff for coun-
try X can be found by solving the following equation :
ω = WX
(
e, τNX , τ
c
−x
) − WX (e, τ cx, τ c−x)
ω =
441β2(τcx)
2−84eβτ CX+4e2
504β
Solving for τCX , τ cx =
2[e−
√
126βω]
21β
= 2[e−e¯]
21β
..........(15)
Proof of the above results
For any positive welfare gain from deviation ω > 0 if e = 0 and τ cx = 0
Ω(0, τNx (0), 0) = W (0, τ
N
x (0), 0)−W (0, 0, 0) = 0 < ω solving for e¯
8
Ω(e¯, τNx (0), 0) = W (e¯, τ
N
x (e¯), 0)−W (e¯, 0, 0)
W3(e¯, 0, 0) = 4
∫ α/β
α−1
β
C (P ) dP +
∫ α−1
β
0
(1− e) dP + 3
∫ α−1
β
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP
=
2(2α− 1)
β
W3(e¯, τ
N
x (e¯), 0) =
∫ α
β
21(α−1)+e
21β
+3
∫ α/β
α−1
β
C (P ) dP+
∫ 21(α−1)+e
21β
0 (1− e) dP+3
∫ α−1
β
0
(
1 + e
3
)
dP+
2( 2e
21β
)[ e
3
− e
21
]
= 252(2α−1)+e
2
126β
Hence, Ω(e¯1, τNx (0), 0) = W (e¯1, τNx (e¯1), 0) − W (e¯1, 0, 0) = 252(2α−1)+e
2
126β
−
2(2α−1)
β
= e
126β
Therefore, ω = e2
126β
solving e¯ =⇒ e¯ = √126βω1
Putting together the Phase III most cooperative tariffs :
τˆ cx(e) =
 0 if e ∈ [0, e¯];2(e−e¯)
21β
if e ∈ (e¯, 1].
..........(16)
Equation (16) illustrates the cooperative tariff chosen by the four countries.
The phase III no defect condition requires :
Ω3(e, τ
c
X(e), τ
c
Y (e, τ
c
w(e), τ
c
Z(e) ≤ ω3(e, τ cX(e), τ cY (e, τ cw(e), τ cZ(e)) , ∀e..........(17)
The next step is to demonstrate the conditions prescribed under (13) and (17)
is not violated. After the expected values we define new function that shows the
joint conditions of equation .To do this we solve (13)
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Using ω in the above equation:
ω = δ
1−δ
1
1323
[
2
(√
126βω
)3 − 6 (126βω) + 6√126βω]
Define a function :
F (y) = 2y
3
2 − 6y + 6y 12
F ′ (y) = 3 (y)
1
2 − 6 + 3 (y)− 12 = 3
(
y
1
2 + y−
1
2 − 2
)
= 3
(√
y − 1)2√
y
> 0 iff y ̸= 1
F ′′ (y) = 3
1
2
(y)−
1
2 − 31
2
(y)−
3
2 =
3
2
(
y−
1
2 − y− 32
)
=
3
2
(
1√
y
− 1
y
3
2
)
=
3 (x− 1)
2y
3
2
< 0 iff y < 1
ω˜ (ω) =
δ
1− δ
2
(√
126βω
)3 − 6(126)βω + 6√126βω
1323β
=
δ
1− δ
F (126βω)
1323β
ω˜ (0) = δ
1−δ
F (0)
1323β
= 0
ω˜′ (ω) = δ
1−δ
126
1323
F ′ (126βω) > 0 iff 126βω ̸= 1⇒ ω ̸= 1
126β
ω˜′ (0) = δ
1−δ
126
1323
F ′ (0) = δ
1−δ
126
1323
3 (0−1)
2
0
= +∞
ω˜′
(
1
126β
)
= δ
1−δ
126
1323
F ′ (1) = δ
1−δ
126
1323
3 (1−1)
2
1
= 0
ω˜′′1 (ω1) =
δ
1−δ
15876β
1323
F ′′ (126βω) < 0 iff 126βω < 1⇒ ω1 < 1126β .............(18)
{0 < ωIII < 1
126β
}
Then ,
=⇒ δ
1−δ
F (1)
1323β
< 1
126β
=⇒ δ < 1323
1575
= 0.84............................(18’)
Lemma 1: The proofs are explianed above:
10
τˆ cx(e) =
 0 if e ∈ [0, e¯3];2(e−e¯)
21β
if e ∈ (e¯3, 1].
...................(16’)
Where: e¯3 =
√
126βω
With ωIII ∈ (0, 1
126β
) the unique interior fixed point:
ω˜III(ω¯) =

δ
1−δ
F (126βω¯)
1323β
if ω¯ ∈ [0, 1
126β
];
δ
1−δ
2
1323β
if ω¯ > 1
126β
.
..............(19)
The implication of lemma 1 is that free trade can be sustained between coun-
tries if the inter-bloc trade volume is low. For low inter-bloc volume of trade,
the incentive for static gain from defect is small. But as along as the trade vol-
ume between blocs increases and sufficiently greater than the reshold volume
of trade, e¯3 , there will be greater incentive to deviate from the cooperation and
hence, free trade could not be an option. As an alternative protection measures,
countries may apply special protections such as safeguarding or countervailing
measures so that the incentive to deviate from the cooperative tariff would be
limmited.
Figure 1, Tariff function in Phase III
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1.4 Phase II
Phase II is the transition period where where there is two parallel trade talks be-
tween pair of countries and trade takes place between countries normally without
any discrimination.
1.4.1 Phase II-Static Game
In phase II , we can characterize the Nash equilibrium by taking country X ,
due to the fact that all countries face the symmetric situation. Hence, the market
clearing price for good X is detrmined where world supply equals world demand
for good x.
P xx =
α−1
β
+ 3τ
x
4
..............................(20)
P−xx =
α−1
β
− τx
4
.............................(21)
Imports: Country X’s import from j’s country, where j ∈ (Y,W,Z) is equal
to country j’s total export of good X. Thus import is given by:
Mxj = (1 +
e
3
)− (α− βP jx) = e3 − βτ
x
4
.............(23)
Now define the welfare of X which is sum of consumer surpluss, Producer
surpluss and tariff revenue.
WX2 =
∫ α/β
PXX
C (P ) dP +
∫ α/β
PXY
C (P ) dP +
∫ α/β
PXW
C (P ) dP +
∫ α/β
PXZ
C (P ) dP
+
∫ PXX
0
(1− e) dP +
∫ PXY
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP +
∫ PXW
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP +
∫ PXZ
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP
τXMXY + τ
XMXW + τ
XMXZ ..............................................(24)
12
Using equation (24), we can derive the optimal tariff for country X,
∂WX2
∂τX
= e
4
− 15
16
βτX ............(25)
This imply that WX2 is strictly concave in τX and the best response tariff for
X eqaul:
τNX =
4e
15β
.......................................(26)
Note that the Nash tariff in phase III is 2e
21β
which is less than phase II Nash
tariff of 4e
15β
implying that once, FTA is formed between countries, each country
further reduces the external tariff a against the non-members. This is off course
in support of prior literatures about the existence of tariff complementarity effect.
The implication of the tariff complimentary effect is; as tariff on good imported
from FTA partner set to zero, the consumer (consumption of the imported good
with zero tariff increase). Again, higher consumption leads to higher import
demand from both FTA and non-FTA partner and thus higher tariff revenue from
import of the good from the non-FTA trade partner.
1.4.2 Phase II-Dynamic Game
Now we turn to characterize to the phase II dynamic game; doing so , we first
look at the most cooperative tariff function that can be supported in the transition
phase . We start by examining the static incentive to gain from defecting from
cooperative tariff.
The static gain from defection is given by :
Ω2(τ
N
x , τ
C
x , τ
C
−x) = W
x
2 (τ
N
x , τ
C
−x)−W x2 (τCx , τC−x)................(27)
13
= 15β
32
[(τCx )
2 − (τNx )2] + e4 [τNx − τCx ]
Thus;
dΩ2(e,τNx ,τ
C
x ,τ
c
−x)
de
=
∂Wx2 (e,τ
N
x ,τ
C
x ,τ
c
−x)
∂e
−∂Wx2 (e,τcx,τCx ,τc−x)
∂e
= 1
4
[τNx −τ cx].....................(28)
dΩ2(e,τNx ,τ
c
x,τ
c
−x)
dτcx
=
∂Wx2 (e,τ
N
x ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
∂τc−x
− ∂Wx2 (e,τcx,τCx ,τCx )
∂τCx
= −[1
4
τNx − 7β4 τ cx]......(29)
Using the Envelope theorem, dΩ(e,τ
N
x ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
de
> 0 and dΩ(e,τ
N
x ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
dτCx
< 0 this
is true if and only if τCx < 4e15β = τ
N
x . In other words if the cooperative tariff is
set to the Nash tariff, there is no incentive to cheat.
The discounted expected future welfare loss for a country that violates the
multilateral cooperation today is given by;
ωII = (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ [EW2(e, τ
c
x, τ
c
−x)−EW2(e, τNx , τN−x)]+ λ1−(1−λ)δωIII ......................(30)
Finally,ωII = (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
[
2
75β
(
var (e) + (E (e))2
)− 3β
8
(
var (τ c) + (E (τ c))2
)]
+
λωIII
1−(1−λ) .....(31)
We initially fix ωII at an arbitrary non- negative value and solve the smallest
possible non negative cooperative tariff as well as the threshold volume of trade.
Thus, fixing ω¯ > 0 and solving for e¯
ωII = WX(e¯, τNX (e¯), 0)−WX(e¯, 0, 0) = e
2
30β
Solving for e¯2 =
√
30βωII ..............................(32)
Thus, the most cooperative function is given by:
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τˆ cx(e) =
 0 if e ∈ [0, e¯2];4(e−e¯2)
15β
if e ∈ (e¯2, 1].
..........(33)
ω˜II(ωII) = (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
[[
2(
√
30β ω )
3−180βω+6√30βω
]
225β
]
+ λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III ...............34
Define a function :
F (y) = 2y
3
2 − 6y + 6y 12
ω˜II(ωII) = (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
F(30βωII)
225β
+ λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III
ω˜
′II(ωII) = (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
30F(30βωII)
225β
> 0 iff 30βωII ̸= 1 =⇒ ωII ̸= 1
30
ω˜
′II(0) =∞
ω˜
′II( 1
30β
) = (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
30F (1)
225β
= 0
ω˜
′′II(ω) = (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
900F(30βωII)
225β
< 0 iff 30β < 1 =⇒ ωII < 1
30β
Therefore, the neccessary and sufficient condition for a unique fixed point
ωII ∈ (0, 1
30β
) is ω˜II( 1
30β
) < 1
30β
Lemma 2 The proofs are discussed above:
The most cooperative tariff in Phase II is
τˆ c(e) =
 0 if e ∈ [0, e¯2];4(e−e¯2)
15β
if e ∈ (e¯2, 1].
..................(35)
e¯2 =
√
30βωII
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With ωII ∈ (0, 1
30β
) being the unique fixed point:
ω˜II(ω¯) =

(1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
F (30βω¯)
225β
+ λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III if ω¯II ∈ [0, 1
30β
];
(1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
2
225β
+ λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III if ω¯II > 1
30β
.
........(36)
Having all these most cooperative tariffs, we compare ωII and ωIII
Lemma 3: ωII < ωIII The proof for this is in the appendex:
The implication of Lemma 3 has the following corollary :
Corollary 1: e¯II < e¯III and corollary 1 implies the following proposition:
Proposition 1: τˆ c2(e) = τˆ c3(e) = 0 for e ∈ [0, e¯2]; and τˆ c2(e) > τˆ c3(e) for
e ∈ [e¯2, 1]
An important observation of phase II is that, the volume of inter-bloc trade in
phase is lower than that of phase III implying that protection measures are more
frequent and higher as compared to phase III. As it is noted in Tabakis(2015),
Lemma 3 entails that the cooperative effect of multilateral trade liberalism dom-
inates the punishment effect of defection.
Figure 2, Tariff Function in phase II relative to phase III
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1.5 Phase I
Phase I is a period where countries trade normally but expecting trade negotia-
tion will start soon between countries . Here the phase I static game outcome is
similar with that of phase-II. Where the static Nash- equilibrium is :τNj = 4e15β
where j=X,Y,W and Z
1.5.1 Phase I-Dyamic Game
Now we turn to analyze the most cooperative tariff that can be supported during
the pre-negotiation period. We start by analyzing the static incentive to cheat
from the most cooperative tariff. Welfare gain from cheating the most coopera-
tive tariff(one time cheat in phase I)
Ω(τNx , τ
C
x , τ
C
−x) = W
x(τNx , τ
C
−x)−W x(τCx , τC−x)................(37)
= 15β
32
[(τCx )
2 − (τNx )2] + e4 [τNx − τCx ]
dΩ(e,τNx ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
de
=
∂Wx(e,τNx ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
∂e
−∂Wx(e,τcx,τCx ,τC−x)
∂e
= 1
4
[τNx −τC−x].....................(38)
∂Ω(e,τNx ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
∂τCx
=
∂Wx(e,τNx ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
∂τC−x
−∂Wx(e,τcx,τCx ,τCx )
∂τCx
= −[1
4
τNx −7β4 τCx ]......(39)
Using the Envelope theorem, dΩ(e,τ
N
x ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
de
> 0 and ∂Ω(e,τ
N
x ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
∂τCx
< 0 this
is true if and only if τCx < 4e15β = τ
N
x . In other words if the cooperative tariff is
set to the Nash tariff, there is no incentive to cheat.
The discounted expected future welfare loss for a country that violates the
multilateral cooperation today is given by;
ωI = (1−ρ)δ
1−(1−ρ)δ
[
EW
(
e, τ cx, τ
c
−x
)− EW (e, τNx , τN−x)]+ ρ1−(1−ρ)δ ωII−λω1III1−λ
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Finally,ωI = (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
[
2
75β
(
var (e) + (E (e))2
)− 3β
8
(
var (τ c) + (E (τ c))2
)]
+
ρ
1−(1−ρ)δ
ωII−λωIII
1−λ
ω˜I(ωI) = (1−ρ)δ
1−(1−ρ)δE
[
−225β2(τcx)2+16e2
600β
]
+ ρ
1−(1−ρ)δ
ωII−λωIII
1−λ .
Using the distribution of e, we can calculate E(τ cx)2 and E(τ cw)2
Hence,
ω˜1
I(ωI) = (1−ρ)δ
1−(1−ρ)δ [
2(
√
30βωI)3−180βωI+6
√
30βωI
225β
] + ρ
1−(1−ρ)δ
ωII−λωIII
1−λ
Lemma 4: The most Cooperative tariff function in Phase I:
τˆ c(e) =
 0 if e ∈ [0, e¯1];4(e−e¯)
15β
if e ∈ (e¯, 1].
e¯1 =
√
30βωI
With ωI ∈ (0, 1
30β
) being the unique fixed point:
ω˜I(ω¯) =

(1−ρ)δ
1−(1−ρ)δ
F(30βω¯I)
225β
+ ρ
1−(1−ρ)δ
ωII−δωIII
1−λ if ω¯
I ∈ [0, 1
30β
];
(1−ρ)δ
1−(1−ρ)δ
2
225β
+ ρ
1−(1−ρ)δ
ωII−δωIII
1−λ if ω¯
I > 1
30β
.
Now let’s compare ωI and ωII
Lemma 5: ωI < ωII From Lemma 4 and Lemma 6 =⇒ ωI < ωIII
Corollary 3: e¯I < e¯II < e¯III based on this we can put the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 2: τˆ c1(e) = τˆ c2(e) = τˆ c3(e) = 0 if e ∈ [0, e¯1] and τˆ c1(e) >
τˆ c2(e) > τˆ
c
3(e) if e ∈ (e¯1, 1]
Implications:Comparing phase II and I, even in the absence of FTA , the
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prospects of having FTA between countries in the future, as soon as parallel trade
talk is opened between them, the ability of countries to multilaterally cooperate
starts to realized and hence, any trade tension among them starts to decline.
Figure 3, Tariff function in Phase I relative to Phase II and III
1.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of free-trade areas (FTAs) on the use of con-
tingent protection between competing exporters. We consider four country four
goods model and develop a dynamic model similar to the competing-importers
one of Tabakis (2015), where cooperation to multilateral trade agreement is self-
enforcing and the economic environment is characterized by trade-flow volatil-
ity. We classify the period s in to three distinct but interrelated phases, phase I
which is pre negotiation period, phase II negotiation period and phase III , the
period where the world has two symmetric FTAs among the four countries who
are competing for export. Our analysis demonstrates that the findings of Tabakis
(2015) extend to our competing-exporters case. In particular, the parallel forma-
tion of different FTAs results in a gradual but permanent easing of multilateral
trade tensions, especially as far as contingent protection is concerned. Thus, our
19
results supports the building-block effect of FTAs on multilateral trade cooper-
ation.
Though our model shows an extension of the previous literatures based on re-
strictive assumptions, we believe the result will give a bench mark theoretical
justifications for the ongoing debates about the ability of formation of FTAs to
enhance multilateral cooperation. The future area of research might be relaxing
the assumptions such as considering asymmetric formation of FTAs to obtain
more robust result on the question at hand.
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1.7 Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 3
Following Similar procedure as in Tabakis(2015), we have the following :
Given the condition for existence of unique solution in ωII ∈ (0, 1
30β
) We
define a continuous function φ(ω¯II) = ω˜II(ω¯II)− ω¯II
φ(0) = λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III
i > 0 Thus if φ(ωIII) − ωIII < 0 then we must have
φ(ω¯II) = 0 in the interval (0, ωIII) =⇒ ωII < ωIII
Hence,The following should be satisfied
ω˜II(ωIII) < ωIII ⇐⇒ (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
F(30βωIII)
225β
+ λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III < ωIII
Rearranging :
⇐⇒ (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
F(30βωIIIi )
225β
< (1−λ)(1−δ)
1−(1−λ)δ ω
III
i
⇐⇒ δ F(30βω
III
i )
225β
< (1− δ)ωIIIi
⇐⇒ F (30βωIII) < (1− δ)ωIII 225β
δ
=⇒ F (30βωIII) < 225βωIIIδ
1−δ
Re-
call from the proof of Lemma 1 F(y) is strictly increasing for all y except y ̸= 1:
Hence,
=⇒ F (30βωIII) < 225βωIIIδ
1−δ
Thus: Since ωIII < 1
126β
< 1
30β
, F is strictly increasing
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=⇒ F (126βωIII) > F (30βωIII) < 225βωIIIδ
1−δ
=⇒ F (126βωIII) > 225βωIIIδ
1−δ
From Lemma 1 we have F
(
126βωIII
)
= 1323βω
III
δ
1−δ
Therefore, 1323βωIIIδ
1−δ
> 225βω
III
δ
1−δ
Proof of Lemma 5:
Using the same techniques as in the proof of Lemma 4, we define a function
pi
(
ω¯I
) ≡ ω˜I(ω¯I)− ω¯I and recalling ωI ∈ (0, 1
30β
) if we evaluate φ(0) = ω˜(0)−
0 =
ρ(ωII −ωIII)
[1−(1−ρ)δ][1−λ] > 0
And ρ(ω
II −ωIII)
[1−(1−ρ)δ][1−λ] =
ρ
[1−(1−ρ)δ][1−λ]
[
(1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)
F(30βωII)
225β
+ λ(δ−λδ)
1−(1−λ)δω
III
]
Therefore if pi(ωII) < ω˜I(ωII) − ωII < 0 =⇒ pi(ω¯I) = 0 at some point
(0, ωI)
Next we will check if pi(ωII) < ω˜I(ωII)− ωII < 0
pi(ωII) < ω˜I(ωII)− ωII < 0 =⇒ ω˜I(ωII) < ωII
=⇒ (1−ρ)δ
1−(1−ρ)δ
F(30βωII)
225β
+ ρ
1−(1−ρ)δ
ωII−λωIII
1−λ < ω
II
⇐⇒ ρ
[1−(1−ρ)δ][1−λ]
[
(1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)
F(30βωII)
225β
+ λ(δ−λδ)
1−(1−λ)δω
III
] [
(1−ρ )δ
1−(1−ρ )δ
F(30β ω II)
225β
]
+
(1−ρ)δ
1−(1−ρ)δ
F(30βωII)
225β
< (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
F(30βωII)
225β
+ λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III ⇐⇒
λδ
[1−(1−ρ)δ][1−(1−λ)δ]
[
F(30βωII)
225β
− F(126βω
III)
1323β
]
< 0
Note: The term in the bracket is negative becuase from lemma 3, ωII <
ωIII =⇒ F (30βωII) < F (30βωIII) Since, λδ
[1−(1−ρ)δ][1−(1−λ)δ] > 0 ; we need
to show
[
F(30βωII)
225β
− F(126βω
III)
1323β
]
is negative .Devide all terms by δ
1−δ
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F(30βωII)
225β
δ
1−δ
− F(126β ω
III)
1323β
δ
1−δ
From Lemma 1 F
(
126β ω III
)
= 1323βδ
1−δ
=⇒ F(126β ω
III)
1323β
δ
1−δ
= 1
From Lemma 4: F
(
30β ω III
)
< 225βδ
1−δ
andωII < ωIII =⇒ F (30βωII) <
F
(
30β ω III
)
< 225βδ
1−δ
Becuase F is increasing. This implies that F(30β ω
III)
225β
δ
1−δ
<
1 and hence ,
[
F(30βωII)
225β
− F(126βω
III)
1323β
]
is negativ
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CHAPTER 2. THE LEGACY OF CONFLICT ON TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS
2.1 Introduction
Despite existence of a heated debate among trade economists and policymakers
about the role of RTAs on the realization of multilateral trading system, there is
unprecedented increase in the number and coverage of regionalism. Most of the
worlds country has moved towards freer trade onwards 1990s.The establishment
of the General agreement on tariff (GATT) paved the way for such expansion
(Milner, 1999). Besides the standard economic gains from regional integra-
tion, RTAs can produce significant political gains for their member countries,
such as reduction in interstate conflict between RTA members (peace-creation
effect).The one that is mentioned in most literature for the support of such ar-
gument is European Coal and still Community(ECSC) which was established
in 1951 following Robert Schuman’s proposal. Many historians and political
scientists argue that the driving force of the ECSC was mainly to solidify peace
so as to avoid other destructive conflicts that has been seen in the major world
wars.
The peace creation effect of RTA is discussed in many literatures in relation
to the liberal Peace argument; which states that bilateral trade reduces the prob-
ability of interstate conflict. The argument follows from that, RTAs create trade
and large volume of bilateral trade increases the opportunity cost of interstate
conflict. Martin et al. (2012), has analyzed such two-stage links, i.e. in the
first stage RTAs create trade and the second stage trade reduces the probability
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of interstate conflict and find that RTAs are more likely to be signed between
countries who have higher frequency of past conflict. Martin et al. (2008) also
showed both theretically and empirically abouth dampening impact of bilateral
trade openess on probability of conflict but contrsting result for multilateral trade
openess. Costas et al.(2016) investigate both theoretically and empirically the
implication of Preferential trade agreement for interstate conflict and found that
preferential trade agreements produce both peace creation and peace diversion
effects, where the peace creation effect is found between member countries.
Therefore, depending on the RTA in question, economic integration and
peace solidification can both occupy center stage on the agenda of the prospec-
tive RTA partners during the trade negotiations, affecting their duration.It is well
known that the duration of negotiations across RTAs differs substantially, but
this phenomenon has not received much attention in the literature.
In this paper, we explore for the first time the legacy of past conflict on RTA
negotiations. Two offsetting forces are at work here. On the one hand, past
conflict might reduce trust between prospective RTA partners, prolonging the
trade negotiations. On the other hand, past conflict might induce the negotiating
countries to conclude the negotiations faster in order to reap the peace-creation
benefits of an RTA. It is well documented in the literature that history of conflict
lowers bilateral trust. For example, Guiso et al. (2009) reported an evidence
that Countries with a long history of wars tend to trust each other less. There is
also a theoretical link between historical cooperation and conflict with current
cooperation (Ansell and Gash, 2007)
We test the offsetting predictions using a unique dataset on the history of
formation of a large number of RTAs (Tabakis and Zanardi, 2018) from 1972
onwards as well as data on conflict from the Correlates of War project(COW).
By employing survival analysis techniques for duration of trade negoattion from
the start to the end and our results provide robust evidence in support of acceler-
ating effect of conflict on negotiation: country pairs with past history of conflict
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conclude their trade negotiations relatively faster—1.5 to 2 times faster in com-
parison with country pairs with no history of conflict. Apart from the conflict
variable our finding suggest that trade conducted bilaterally takes significantly
shorter time while it takes much longer time if EU takes part in the process. This
has implications on the number of participant and additional provisions that EU
might require.
The implication of duration of trade negotiation can be seen from two dif-
ferent major perspectives; economic and political. The economic implication is
related with its impact on firms’ investment decision. The anticipation of trade
liberalization by firms affect firm-level adjustment that address to innovate and
enter into the export market (Constantini and Melitz, 2008 ; Burstein and Melitz,
2011). In their dynamic model of firm level adjustments for economic openess,
Constantini and Melitz (2008) showed anticipation effect of trade liberalization
that induces firms to innovate ahead of export market entry. Thus, knowing fac-
tors affecting the process of trade negotiation can help firms by reducing their
uncertainty while taking investment decisions in preparing the anticipated trade
liberalization era.
In this paper, we make two major contributions to the literature. First, we
estimate the magnitude of the effect of past conflict on the duration of trade
negotiations, which has important ramifications for firms’ investment decisions.
Second, we highlight the prominence of non-economic reasons in negotiating
and establishing RTAs.
2.2 Theory and Foundation of Trade Agreements:
An overview
In this part, we provide a brief explanation of the genesis of regional trade agree-
ments from historical view and some theoretical justifications about the purpose
of forming RTAs. The general agreement on trade and tariff (GATT), was estab-
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lished back in 1947 with an initial number of 23 member countries. Now a day
the former GATT got the new name called World trade organization(WTO) with
greater scopes at Uruguay round in 1995, which took about 8 years of negotia-
tion from 1986 to 1994 currently having 164 members, which represent about 98
per cent of the world trade. The formation of regional integration has long his-
tory, dated back to 1860 (Ashely,1904 cited in (Grossman & Helpman, 2018)),
the first bilateral agreement between France and Britain called Cobden-chevalier
Treaty. The Cobden-chevalier Treaty paved a way for waves of bilateral negotia-
tion among the major powers of Europe, what (Baldwin, 1993) called – ‘domino
effects of Regionalism’. Most of the world’s country has moved towards freer
trade onwards 1980s. The conclusion of multilateral trade negotiations such as
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) pave a way for RTAs to
flourish (Milner, 1999).
Currently all WTO members have an RTA in force. According to WTO re-
port between 1948-1994, about 124 RTAs were notified to GATT/WTO, this
number has increased dramatically after the creation of the WTO in 1995, more
than 400 RTAs were notified out of it about 288 RTAs are in force. Fig. 1. Sum-
marize the evolution of RTAs since 1948. The figure clearly shows an increase
gap between number of RTAs notified and RTAs in in force in recent years.
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2.2.1 Why Countries sign RTAs?
When countries are signing binding agreements, they are limiting their sovereign
rights. Thus, the question is thus; what are the motivating factors for a given
country to participate such agreements? Countries have been implementing re-
gional trade agreements for both political and economic motives. Bagwell and
Staiger, (2002) discussed the motives for forming RTAs by developing three
major theoretical approaches; the traditional economic approach, the political
economic approach and the commitment approach. The first approach explains
the role of the government in targeting to maximize social welfare by manipu-
lating the terms of trade using tariff as an instrument. Bagwell and Staiger cited
Harry Johnson (1953) who analyzed the strategic interdependence among coun-
tries’, national welfare maximizing government uses tariff as an instrument to
manipulate to control terms of trade driven inefficiencies and pointed out that
tariffs is being the outcome of a static game played by a pair countries who have
welfare-maximizing governments. Thus, according to this approach Bagwell
and Staiger (2002) conclude that the pursuit of terms of trade gain alone will
lead the government to be more inefficient by dragging back from the efficient
outcome of reciprocal free trade to the inefficient Nash equilibrium outcome.
Hence, free trade is the remedy that guides the government from inefficient out-
come to Pareto efficient outcomes.
In the second approach; they emphasize how the government tariff selection
is transmitted to distributional and economic efficiency consequences. Tariff set-
ting decision for politically motivated Policy makers usually goes beyond terms
of trade manipulation. The motivating force such government is to re-distribute
income to so that voters can alter their decision in favor of the electorate or to
groups that campaign support. Such inward-looking behavior of the government
to in altering their trade policy through tariff might be followed by inefficiencies
that trade agreement can be taken as a remedy. Grossman and Helpman (1995)
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examined if trade agreement can be emerged as an equilibrium outcome between
two politically motivated governments and they claim that liberalization arises
when FTA results substantial welfare gain for average voters and when there is
a net gain for potential exporters.
Bagwell and Staiger (2002) discusses if there exists a separate political mo-
tive for trade agreements. Their analysis follows two approaches: government
preference (combination of welfare maximization as well as distributional con-
cerns) and the possibility of efficiency once the motive of influencing terms of
trade through tariff is ignored. They made three major observations from their
analysis of political economy approach. Firstly, when government set their trade
policies unilaterally, the Nash equilibrium (non-cooperative Nash equilibrium)
fails to satisfy the condition for efficiency. Second, trade agreements among po-
litically motivated governments must entail reciprocal trade liberalization. The
implication for this observation is that trade policy in a unilateral fashion leads
to higher tariff rate which is in efficient. Hence, trade agreement in bilateral
fashion will help both governments to gain from trade. Under this observation,
there are two externalities that we can consider: “terms-of-trade externality” and
“Political externality”. In the previous approach, trade agreement as an outcome
of terms-of-trade externality was discussed. The question under this approach is
hence, if inefficiencies that arise due to political externality is remedied by trade
agreements. Maggi and Rodríguez (2007) and Grossman (2016) also presented
theoretically the importance of politics for trade agreement.
In the second approach; they emphasize how the government tariff selection
is transmitted to distributional and economic efficiency consequences. Politi-
cally motivated Policy makers might be tempted to choose protectionist poli-
cies not (or not only) to manipulate the terms of trade, but rather (or also) to
re-distribute income to swing voters in the electorate or to groups that campaign
support. The inward-looking behavior of the government to manipulate terms of
trade may create an inefficiency that trade agreement can be taken as a remedy.
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Grossman and Helpman (1995) examined if trade agreement can be emerged
as an equilibrium outcome between two politically motivated governments using
a political-economy framework that emphasizes the interaction between industry
special- interest groups and an incumbent government. As a necessary condition
for FTA to be an equilibrium outcome, they describe both cases when the agree-
ment must cover all bilateral trade and when a few politically sensitive sectors
can be excluded from the agreement. According to them, a government might
endorse an agreement in two types of situations if an FTA must completely lib-
eralize trade among the partner countries, the first arises when the FTA would
generate substantial welfare gains for the average voter and adversely affected
interest groups fail to coordinate their efforts to defeat the accord. The sec-
ond arises when the agreement would create profit gains for actual or potential
exporters more than the losses that would be suffered by import-competing in-
dustries, plus the political cost of any welfare harm that might be inflicted on the
average voters.
Bagwell and Staiger (2002) discusses if there exists a separate political mo-
tive for trade agreements. Their analysis follows two approaches: government
preference (combination of welfare maximization as well as distributional con-
cerns) and the possibility of efficiency if governments tariff selection ignores
their ability to affect the terms of trade. They made three major observations
from their analysis of political economy approach. Firstly, when government
set their trade policies unilaterally, the Nash equilibrium (non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium) fails to satisfy the condition for efficiency. Second, trade agree-
ments among politically motivated governments must entail reciprocal trade lib-
eralization. The implication for this observation is that trade policy in a unilateral
fashion leads to higher tariff rate which is in efficient. Hence, trade agreement
in bilateral fashion will help both governments to gain from trade. Under this
observation, there are two externalities that we can consider: “terms-of-trade
externality” and “Political externality”. In the previous approach, we have seen
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that terms-of-trade externality as a main reason for trade agreements. The ques-
tion under this approach is hence, if inefficiencies that arise due to political ex-
ternality is remedied by trade agreements. The conclusion here is, where the
government maximizes national welfare, it will consider the politically optimal
tariff that corresponds to the reciprocal free trade. The third observation is that,
politically optimal tariffs are efficient. The implication of this observation is
that if a term of trade motivation is removed and if each government sets tariffs
optimally, any slight reduction in tariff in any one country will reduce the local
preferred price at home and abroad. This results a reduction in world price. How-
ever, the reduction in world price cannot generate any efficiency, it is just pure
international transfer in tariff revenue. This follows that if terms-of-trade moti-
vation is ignored from trade policy choice, there is no further scope for Pareto
improvements. Hence, according to them politically motivated governments en-
gage in trade agreements only to correct for terms of trade externalities. Thus,
”politics” does not affect the motivation to engage in trade agreement.
According to the commitment theory, trade agreement can be used as a rem-
edy for difficulties in making credible policy and dynamic time inconsistency.
Staiger and Tabellini (1987) found an evidence that rules prescribed under GATT
helped the US government to make domestic trade policy commitments that
it could not have made in the absence of these rules. Matsuyama (1990) also
showed the possibility of this using different game structure.
Unlike the traditional approach, under the commitment approach the game is
between the government and its private sector. That is government makes policy
and agents make their decision based on the policy. The more the government is
flexible the more the problem of credibility and hence inefficiency. Thus, more
government’s decision is flexible, the more cost trade policy will have. Trade
agreement can be a remedy to make a government to be committed on preferred
tariff policy (Grossman ,2016).
Though the motivation of forming RTAs are justified from traditional eco-
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nomic approach and domestic politics point of view, there is a growing evidence
that the purpose of signing regional trade agreements (RTAs) are beyond the
trade creation effects. The peace creation effects of RTAs have becoming a cen-
ter of attention in recent empirical works. According to the Liberal Peace argu-
ment, trade flows between country pairs reduces the probability of future conflict
by increasing the opportunity cost of conflict. Thus, RTAs can be signed between
members who are inspired by its peace creation effects. Regarding the relation-
ship between conflict and formation of RTAs, Martin, Mayer, & Thoenig, 2016
; Vicard, 2012) showed the complementarity between economic and political
determinates of the formation of RTAs: and showed that , countries with higher
frequency of past war are more likely to sign RTAs. Thus, economic factors and
political factors are two sides of a coin in negotiating RTAs. Many more schol-
ars argue that the driving force of concluding RTAs is mostly due to its peace
creation effect though it has a contagious effect latter once the first agreement
is concluded (Baldwin, 1993). Many believe that the European coal and Steel
community(ECSC) in 1951 was established mainly to avoid conflict and create
peace than commercial purpose. Hadjiyiannis, Iris, & Tabakis, (2012) develop
a theoretical framework explaining the peace creation effect of RTAs. There is
an empirical evidence that signing of RTAs will reduce the possibility of future
conflict among signing countries
Generally, countries signed RTAs due to economic, domestic politics and
international politics point view. Hence, the complexity of negotiating RTAs
depends on which driving force dominates among others. This paper uncovers
such fact that given other factors, an RTA between country pairs involved history
of conflict takes relatively shorter period of negotiation as compared to country
pairs who don’t have such conflicts at least in the past 200 years.
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2.3 Related Literatures
2.3.1 Theoretical Consideration
When we analyze the impact of historical conflict on current cooperation, two
testable predictions are at work; the pursuit of peace creation and the dampen-
ing effect of conflict on trust and hence, cooperation. in their dynamic theory
of civil conflict on trust and trade between the conflicting ethnic group, Rohner,
Thoenig, & Zilibotti (2013) explained the dampening effect of current conflict
on future trust and creates a disincentive for cooperation. Similarly, Acemoglu
& Walitz ( 2012) showed theoretically the possibility of conflict on breaking
trust and hence trade and cooperation. Thus, we develop our model based on
Ansell￿& Gash’s￿model of participatory government Ansell & Gash’s (2007).
In their model, they explained how incentive and constraints to participate in
each decision-making process is linked with cooperation and an intended out-
come. We borrowed their idea to frame the models for the process of concluding
regional trade agreements.
Ansell & Gash (2007) discussed the role of initial conditions for participa-
tion as a main deriving force either to facilitate or discourage cooperation among
stakeholders. Likewise, this model can be applicable for country pairs initial
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condition to participate in trade negotiation. The economic reasons, domestic
political conditions and country pairs historical cooperation or conflict are some
of the main ingredients that has an implication in trade negotiation process. His-
torical bilateral conflict, which is the focus of this paper, hinders cooperation
among participants (Andranovich ,1995). However, there is a way to argue that
presence of historical conflict can ease the complexity of the negotiation between
participating countries who are inspired by solidifying peace.
2.3.2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we provide some related literatures under the umbrella of two
basic topics: why duration matters and prior evidences on duration variability.
Regarding the standard economic gains of RATs, much has been said in the liter-
ature about the trade creation effects of RTAs. Which has direct implications for
firm level adjustments for the new market. In his dynamic industry model with
heterogamous firms Melitz (2003) analyzed the intra-industry effects of inter-
national trade and showed, productivity difference among firms resulted entry
and exit to the export market. But this might have different magnitudes if agents
are forward looking. Anticipation of future market have an impact on current re-
sources allocation behaviors of firms. For example, Freund and McLaren (1999)
showed how anticipated trade agreement affects current trade adjustments. Us-
ing the case of counties joining the EU and show their trade responds to trade
talks 4 years before the conclusion. Similarly Magee (2008) showed that trade
increases by about 26 per- cent before FTA is realized between negotiating coun-
tries. More studies have shown the existence of such anticipatory trade effects.
That is when bilateral trade negotiations start between country pairs, there trade
increases before the RTA come into force (Croce et al. ,2004; Molders and Volz,
2011; Bergin and Lin, 2012; Coulibaly ,2007, C. Lakatos and L. Nilsson ,2016).
The implication is when agents speculate future trade agreement they will alter
their current behavior to maximize current and future returns. Hence, if trade
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agreement is launched between countries, how long it will take matters a lot
for forward looking welfare maximizing agents. Though duration of trade ne-
gotiation differs substantially, the phenomenon has not received much attention
in the literature. Few empirical evidence has presented some evidences about
the determinants of such variation. Moser & Rose (2012) emphasize the eco-
nomic reasons; using semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model for 88
RTAs, they found that trade negotiation between different regions and involv-
ing many participants in the negotiation table takes relatively longer durations
while negotiations between open and richer countries takes shorter time periods.
On the other similar work Mölders (2016), stresses the political factors such as
democratic regime; and using duration analysis for event data, they pointed out
that while political constraints are associated with longer negotiation periods,
country pairs with high level of democratization takes relatively shorter periods.
Though Moser & Rose (2012) and Mölders (2016) give an insight about the de-
terminant factors for duration of trade negotiation, this paper contributes for the
literature about the impact of historical bilateral conflict on duration which is of
course matters a lot in negotiating trade.
2.4 Data and Identification strategies
2.4.1 Data
The main source data used in this paper for military conflicts is the Correlates of
War (COW) project which provide a wide range of dataset related to armed con-
flict. Our key explanatory variable, conflict, used in this paper is occurrence of
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID), which shows all bilateral interstate con-
flicts from 1816 to 2010. The MID database also provides more detail informa-
tion about the intensity of the bilateral conflict and quantifies their intensity on a
1 to 5 hostility level (where 1= no militarized action and 5= War). In this paper,
the key explanatory variable is thus a dummy variable Conflictijt =1 if country i
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and j ever had a conflict at time t or 0 otherwise. we use a broader definition of
conflict from COW which is hostility level 3, 4 and 5. In our robustness analy-
sis, we use a more stricter definition of war by taking only MIDs with hostility
level 4 and 5. Using the advantages of a more detailed information from MID
database such as dates of the start and end of the dispute, we were able to ex-
ploit a broader information of bilateral conflict to analyze the impact. Hence, in
our analysis we controlled for number of peaceful years between the last con-
flict and start of trade negotiation, the duration of war (the sum of all possible
wars before trade negotiation started), frequency of conflict (how many times
the country pairs involved in interstate conflict).
In this paper we employ the unique data set for duration of trade negotiations
by C. Tabakis and Maurizio (2018) . using the details of the unique dataset and
WTO database, we made more robustness analysis by classifying whether the
country i is WTO member or not, the negotiation is bilateral or plurilateral, if
EU is involved or not.
Other control variables
We believe that more open countries are more likely to make the negotiation
process easier. Accordingly, we control for level of trade openness (Country
pairs export/their GDP). we control also level of economic development (Av-
erage GDP per capita difference between Country Pairs) which shows the bar-
gaining power difference. We gather these data on national characteristics from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. It is true that the decision to
participate and cooperate for a common goal might be influenced by set of grav-
ity variables like bilateral distance, common language, contiguity and colonial
linkages. we control such variables and al those come from the Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’lnformations Internationales (CEPII) distance database.
38
2.4.2 Stylized Facts
We have 114 RTAs in our sample of which 98 of them are already concluded
and the rest 16 RTAs are under negotiation. The following figure shows the
variability of the duration for those whose negotiation is finalized.
2.4.3 The Model
In this paper, we motivate our estimation strategy by using the survival analysis
for duration data. Hence, we define the survival function s(t) conditional on set
of covariates. The survival function defined in this context is the probability of
the trade negotiation started at T=0 to survive/ still under negotiation beyond a
given time T=t.
we used the standard Weibull model for survival analysis which adds shape
parameters to fit different kinds of the data. The advantage of the Weibull model
over semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards (PH) model is the later does
not specify any distribution for the conditional hazard rate. Unlike the semi-
parametric Cox proportional hazards (PH) which assumes the hazard ratio be-
tween group is time invariant, the Weibull model assumes a monotonically in-
creasing or decreasing hazard ratios between groups. In this paper, we have done
different sensitivity analysis for such various survival analysis. In the context of
the trade negotiation, the hazard function H(t) refers to the probability that either
the trade negotiation is concluded or not at time t.
The Weibull model assumes a baseline hazard of the form:
h0(t) = pt
p−1exp(β0)
where p is shape parameter and exp(β0) is scale parameter. Thus, condi-
tional on control variables X, the hazard function takes the form :
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H(t) = tp−1exp(X ′ijβ + γ(Conflictij + β0))
Where H(t) is the hazard function, t is failure time (which refers either or not
the trade negotiation is ended), P is the Weibull shape parameter, X is vector of
control variables, Conflictij is a dummy variable 1 if there is historical conflict
between country i and country j.
40
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
(1)
Mean sd
Conflict .0733318 .2606879
Duration of Negotiation in Years 8.4625 3.657506
1=Language is spoken by at least 9% of the population .1108086 .3139041
1=Contiguity .0321478 .1763977
1=Pair ever in colonial relationship .0371872 .1892258
1=Common colonizer post 1945 .0469764 .2115944
1=Pair in colonial relationship post 1945 .0263554 .1601946
Log of bilateral distance 8.479701 .7132394
Bilateral .0151761 .1222565
EU .8076923 .3941249
WTO member .9270158 .2601182
lgGdp_diffb 9.641918 1.279681
Log Openess 4.494921 .3931823
Frequency .261469 1.642985
Peacefull year .0149966 .7618271
War duration .1989818 1.224902
2.5 Empirical Results
￿ In this section we discuss the main results of the paper
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the main variables used in this paper.
Based on group of 114 RTAs under consideration, the average length of time
to conclude the RTA negotiation is about 8.5 years. Figure 2 below depicts the
survival graph for RTA negotiation from the Start to the end for two group of
country pairs; the survival function is plotted according to the country pairs who
have bilateral conflict history and country pairs who don’t have conflict history.
It describes the probability that RTA negotiation process to be longer than a given
time, years in our case. As it is shown, the probability that RTA negotiation to be
longer than a given year is lower for country pairs who have historical conflict
than country pairs who don’t have any conflict prior to the start of the negotia-
tion. Consider for example probability for not observing concluding negotiation
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prior to year 10; the probability for trade negotiations involving history of con-
flict for country pairs is below 25 percent whereas for country pairs who does-
not have conflict history, it is above 25 percent. This support the prediction that
a trade negotiation that involve conflicting country pair take shorter time than
those negotiations who do not have conflict history. The implication is straight
forward; the peace creation motive of RTA formation is strong. The other obser-
vation from figure 2 is that, the two curves in the survival graph tend to intersect
in some points. This is an evidence that proportional hazard assumption is not
supported. Thus we use the Weibull model as a good candidate for the para-
metric approach. In our paper we presented the competing survival models such
as Cox-proportional hazard , Weibull and accelerated failure time. The beauty
of Cox-proportional hazard model is, it allows us to estimate the effect of the
covariates even without specifying the baseline hazard. That is why it is called
semi-parametric model. But the model puts strong assumption that hazards are
proportional between groups and do not depend on time. But this might not be
the case; there may be interaction between time and the covariates which results
the hazard not to be proportional. Fig2. shows this where through the passage
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of time the hazard tend to converge. Hence,we presented the weibull estimates
to check the robustness of our result.
One of the requirement for Weibull distribution, the hazard should be con-
stant (exponential distribution can be used in this case), monotonically increas-
ing or monotonically decreasing. Figure 3 below visualize what the hazard looks
like for the two groups of country pairs (conflict vs non conflict) on average. As
it is shown by the figure the hazard is monotonically decreasing for both groups
on average. Where the probability of surviving longer than a given year is lower
for country pairs with pre negotiation conflict than those who do not have pre
negotiation history of conflict.
The other competing model is which is not depend on the proportional hazard
assumption is the accelerated failure time (AFT) model. This model focuses on
the survival function and therefore the estimates of the coefficient can be directly
interpreted as elasticities on the survival function.
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2.5.2 Main Results
Table 2 show how bilateral conflict affect the length of trade negotiation. The
result in table 2 is based on conflict level which is defined as in correlates of war
dataset from hostility level 3 to 5 for all the years (old and new conflicts). On
average country pairs who have bilateral conflict takes shorter duration (years)
to negotiate FTA than their counter parts.
Table 2.2: Duration between: Start-end of negotiation: (Conflict ; Hostility 3, 4 and 5)
Cox Proportional Hazard Model Weibull Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict 0.70*** 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.52*** 0.78*** 0.53*** 0.45*** 0.60***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14)
Common ethnographic language 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Contiguity -0.10 -0.04 -0.10 -0.18 -0.08 -0.24
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Colonial relationship 0.11 0.10 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.38*
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Common colonizer post 1945 -0.15* -0.13 -0.27*** -0.11 -0.09 -0.26**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Colonial relationship post 1945 -0.53** -0.50** -0.48** -0.69** -0.63** -0.59**
(0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26)
Log of bilateral distance -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.08* -0.10** -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Bilateral 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.43* 0.48* 0.52
(0.21) (0.20) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26) (0.33)
EU -0.80*** -0.80*** -0.73*** -0.50*** -0.49*** -0.34***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
WTO 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.39*** 0.10 0.12 0.35***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
War Frequency -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(1/peacefull year) 0.00 -0.08 0.01* -0.51
(0.00) (1.35) (0.00) (1.55)
Total duration of War 0.03** 0.03** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Log(GDP per capita difference) -0.09*** -0.17***
(0.02) (0.02)
Log (Trade openess) 0.32*** 0.42***
(0.05) (0.07)
_cons -4.71*** -3.71*** -3.64*** -5.06***
(0.07) (0.41) (0.41) (0.54)
ln_p 0.75*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.80***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 17189 17189 17189 16967 17189 17189 17189 16967
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in country pairs) ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01: where Conflict denote Dummy variable=1 if two
countries have had conflict history) , Contiguity refers dummy variable=1 if two countries share common border; Commmon ethnographic language =1
if two countries share common ethnic language (at least 9% of the population; Colonial relationship =1 if two countries ever had colonial link; Common
colonizer post 1945=1 if two countries have had common colonizer after 1945; Colonial relationship post 1945=1 if two countries have had colonial
relationship after 1945: Log of bilateral distance refers Log of Weighted bilateral distance between country pairs; EU=1 if EU is involved; WTO =1 if
one of the country pair is WTO member; War frequency refers the number of bilateral conflict between country pairs; 1/Peaceful year(The reciprocal
of peaceful years between the end of last war and the start of trade negotiation); total duration of war (Duration of war in years); log (Gdp per capita
difference) refers GDP per capita difference b/n country pairs (log form) ; Log (Trade Openess)refers Log of trade openness (the ratio of country pairs
average trade to GDP).
The results in table 2 are based on two competing survival analysis tech-
niques, column 1 to 5 is based on the Semi-Parametric cox PH results and col-
umn 6 to 10 based on the Weibull method. Our result is consistent with this
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different method and with and without control of additional covariates. Our key
variable is the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if there is historical bilateral
conflict. But this might give us little information about the conflict. Thus, we
control for number of peaceful years between the end of the last conflict day and
the beginning of the trade talk, total duration of war, and number of times the
country pairs involved in conflict historically in column 3,4, 7 and 8.
In all the cases our result shows the negotiation between country pairs who
had historical conflict ends relatively faster. Depending on what control vari-
ables we use and estimation method the conflict variable in table 2 shows that
negotation ends from 1.5 to 2 times faster for country pairs who have history of
conflict.
In addition to our conflict variable, the other conflict variable which is dura-
tion of war also gives similar stories.Duration of war in this context is the sum
total of years country pairs involved in conflict regardless of the nature and type
of conflict. The more number of years is associated with faster negotiation. Sim-
ilar with Molders(2016) and Moser and Rose (2012) , Our result also shows if
trade negotiation is conducted bilaterally(between two countries only) it takes
relatively shorter time to conclude. And if country pairs are member of WTO,
the negotiation the negotation process is much faster. On the other hand, If Eu-
ropean Union members take part in the negotiation, it takes much longer time to
conclude.
In table 3 we restrict the broder defination of conflict to a more Stricter defi-
nition of conflict based on the Correlates of War project data. Hence, we consider
hostility level of 4 and 5 only as a conflict variable. Our result is robust to such
restrictions too.
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Table 2.3: Duration between: Start-end of negotiation: (Conflict ; Hostility 4 and 5)
Cox Proportional Hazard Model Weibull Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict 0.67*** 0.40*** 0.33*** 0.42*** 0.75*** 0.47*** 0.36** 0.51***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14)
Common ethnographic language . 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Contiguity -0.06 -0.00 -0.06 -0.12 -0.03 -0.19
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Colonial relationship 0.13 0.12 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.39*
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Common colonizer post 1945 -0.13 -0.12 -0.26*** -0.08 -0.06 -0.24**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Colonial relationship post 1945 -0.55** -0.52** -0.50** -0.70** -0.65*** -0.61**
(0.24) (0.21) (0.22) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26)
Log of bilateral distance -0.05* -0.05* -0.00 -0.10** -0.11** -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Bilateral 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.44* 0.49* 0.52
(0.21) (0.20) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26) (0.32)
EU -0.81*** -0.81*** -0.73*** -0.51*** -0.50*** -0.34***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
WTO 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.40*** 0.12 0.13 0.36***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
War Frequency -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(1/peaceful year) 0.00 0.08 0.01 -0.36
(0.00) (1.21) (0.00) (1.42)
Total duration of War 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Log(GDP per capita difference) -0.09*** -0.17***
(0.02) (0.02)
Log (Trade openess) 0.30*** 0.40***
(0.05) (0.07)
_cons -4.68*** -3.59*** -3.53*** -4.83***
(0.07) (0.41) (0.41) (0.53)
ln_p 0.75*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.80***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 17189 17189 17189 16967 17189 17189 17189 16967
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in country pairs) ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01: where Conflict denote Dummy variable=1 if two
countries have had conflict history) , Contiguity refers dummy variable=1 if two countries share common border; Commmon ethnographic language =1
if two countries share common ethnic language (at least 9% of the population; Colonial relationship =1 if two countries ever had colonial link; Common
colonizer post 1945=1 if two countries have had common colonizer after 1945; Colonial relationship post 1945=1 if two countries have had colonial
relationship after 1945: Log of bilateral distance refers Log of Weighted bilateral distance between country pairs; EU=1 if EU is involved; WTO =1 if
one of the country pair is WTO member; War frequency refers the number of bilateral conflict between country pairs; 1/Peaceful year(The reciprocal
of peaceful years between the end of last war and the start of trade negotiation); total duration of war (Duration of war in years); log (Gdp per capita
difference) refers GDP per capita difference b/n country pairs (log form) ; Log (Trade Openess)refers Log of trade openness (the ratio of country pairs
average trade to GDP).
Our original conflict data includes more old conflict which is more than 100
years. Though we controlled for number of peaceful years in table 2 and 3, one
might argue that more recent conflicts might have different results. Hence, in
table 4 we take only the more recent conflicts as conflict and the rest as non-
conflict. We took post 1950 as new conflict (just 5 years after the end of WW
II) . We found qualitatively similar results in most of the cases ; implying the
robustness of our benchmark estimates. In the Weibull result after we control
for other definition of conflicts, the coefficient in our conflict variable turns out
to be insignificant. But still War duration variable shows significant impact in
failure time.
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Table 2.4: Duration between: Start-end of negotiation: (For recent conflict; After 1950)
Cox Proportional Hazard Model Weibull Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict 0.72*** 0.26** 0.18* 0.23* 0.71*** 0.29* 0.20 0.28*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17)
Common ethnographic language. 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Contiguity 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.11
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Colonial relationship 0.15 0.12 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.40*
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Common colonizer post 1945 -0.17** -0.15* -0.29*** -0.13 -0.10 -0.29**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Colonial relationship post 1945 -0.59** -0.55*** -0.55** -0.74*** -0.69*** -0.67**
(0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26)
Log of bilateral distance -0.06** -0.06** -0.02 -0.11** -0.12*** -0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Bilateral 0.34* 0.35* 0.40* 0.51** 0.53** 0.58*
(0.20) (0.20) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26) (0.32)
EU -0.81*** -0.79*** -0.71*** -0.51*** -0.49*** -0.32***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
WTO 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.39*** 0.13 0.14 0.36***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
War Frequency -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(1/peaceful year) 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.43
(0.00) (1.25) (0.01) (1.43)
Total duration in war 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Log(GDP per capita difference) -0.09*** -0.17***
(0.02) (0.03)
Log (Trade openess) 0.28*** 0.37***
(0.05) (0.07)
_cons -4.61*** -3.41*** -3.43*** -4.57***
(0.07) (0.41) (0.40) (0.53)
ln_p 0.74*** 0.76*** 0.77*** 0.80***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 17189 17189 17189 16967 17189 17189 17189 16967
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in country pairs) ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01: where Conflict denote Dummy variable=1 if two
countries have had conflict history) , Contiguity refers dummy variable=1 if two countries share common border; Commmon ethnographic language =1
if two countries share common ethnic language (at least 9% of the population; Colonial relationship =1 if two countries ever had colonial link; Common
colonizer post 1945=1 if two countries have had common colonizer after 1945; Colonial relationship post 1945=1 if two countries have had colonial
relationship after 1945: Log of bilateral distance refers Log of Weighted bilateral distance between country pairs; EU=1 if EU is involved; WTO =1 if
one of the country pair is WTO member; War frequency refers the number of bilateral conflict between country pairs; 1/Peaceful year(The reciprocal
of peaceful years between the end of last war and the start of trade negotiation); total duration of war (Duration of war in years); log (Gdp per capita
difference) refers GDP per capita difference b/n country pairs (log form) ; Log (Trade Openess)refers Log of trade openness (the ratio of country pairs
average trade to GDP).
As a robustness check, We present results based on accelerated failure time
(AFT) in table 5. The coefficients in this tables are directly interpreted as elas-
ticities on survival function. The advantage of this model is, we no longer bound
by proportional hazard assumption, instead the change in covariates may have
increas- ing or decreasing impact on failure along duration.
As it is shown in table 5, our result is consistent with our baseline result in table
2. Our sensitivity analysis and robustness checks confirms that the result pre-
sented in our baseline regression is viable. Note that our outcome variable is
the time period from the start of the trade negotiation to the end. It is known
that trade negotiations are not made overnight. To start trade negotiation there is
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always preliminary tasks to be done. Thus, one might argue that the pre negoti-
ation periods are more important to determine how long it will take to conclude
the trade talk. That is, countries will make feasibility studies and other related
tasks before they officially start negotiation. To account for such factors, we
control the time period between the date of initiation to the start of the negotia-
tion in our robustness check of table 8. In addition to duration from initiation to
negotiation, we control for the number of participants in the negotiation table.
Thus, our result is robust to such additional controls. The coefficient for duration
from initiation to start of negotiation(‘preparation time’) has significant impact;
the more the preparation time the more the length of negotiation. Similarly, the
more the number of participants in the negotiation table, the more the time to
end the negotiation process.
We also presented a sub sample analysis in table 6 and table 7. Table 6
presents result for those trade agreements where European Union(EU) is in-
volved. The result in tabele 6, for our key variable has very strong impact which
confirms the claims made by political scientists and economists about the estab-
lishment of EU. But when we exclude those trade agreements where there is no
EU, the conflict variable turns out to be insignificant yet the war duration still
matters.
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Table 2.5: Duration between: Start-end of negotiation
Accelerated Failure Time, AFT
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− (1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict -0.37*** -0.24*** -0.21*** -0.27***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Common ethnographic language -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Contiguity 0.08 0.04 0.11
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Colonial relationship -0.11 -0.10 -0.17*
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Common colonizer post 1945 0.05 0.04 0.12**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Colonial relationship post 1945 0.32** 0.29** 0.26**
(0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
Log of bilateral distance 0.04* 0.05** 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Bilateral -0.20* -0.22* -0.23
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15)
EU 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.15***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
WTO -0.05 -0.06 -0.15***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
War Frequency 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
(1/peaceful year) -0.00* 0.23
(0.00) (0.69)
Total duration of War -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01)
Log(GDP per capita difference) 0.07***
(0.01)
Log (Trade openess) -0.19***
(0.03)
_cons 2.22*** 1.72*** 1.68*** 2.27***
(0.01) (0.20) (0.19) (0.24)
ln_p 0.75*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.80***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 17189 17189 17189 16967
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in country pairs) ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01: where Conflict denote
Dummy variable=1 if two countries have had conflict history) , Contiguity refers dummy variable=1 if two countries share common
border; Commmon ethnographic language =1 if two countries share common ethnic language (at least 9% of the population; Colonial
relationship =1 if two countries ever had colonial link; Common colonizer post 1945=1 if two countries have had common colonizer
after 1945; Colonial relationship post 1945=1 if two countries have had colonial relationship after 1945: Log of bilateral distance refers
Log of Weighted bilateral distance between country pairs; EU=1 if EU is involved; WTO =1 if one of the country pair is WTO member;
War frequency refers the number of bilateral conflict between country pairs; 1/Peaceful year(The reciprocal of peaceful years between
the end of last war and the start of trade negotiation); total duration of war (Duration of war in years); log (Gdp per capita difference)
refers GDP per capita difference b/n country pairs (log form) ; Log (Trade Openess)refers Log of trade openness (the ratio of country
pairs average trade to GDP).
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Table 2.6: Duration between: Start-end of negotiation: (Only if EU is involved)
Cox Proportional Hazard Model Weibull Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict 0.64*** 0.60*** 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.93*** 0.79*** 1.26*** 1.25***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.20)
common ethnographic language 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Contiguity 0.31** 0.18 -0.03 0.42** 0.28 -0.08
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.21)
Colonial relationship 0.18 0.20 0.37** 0.29 0.29 0.58***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Common colonizer post 1945 -0.11 -0.11 -0.28*** -0.06 -0.06 -0.31**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Colonial relationship post 1945 -0.41** -0.42** -0.43** -0.57** -0.57** -0.58**
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Log of bilateral distance 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.14** -0.14*** -0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
WTO 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.39*** 0.21** 0.23** 0.35***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
War frequency 0.06* 0.08** 0.04 0.07*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
(1/peacefull year) -12.53** -11.71** -21.84** -19.58**
(5.88) (5.60) (9.09) (7.95)
Total duration of in war -0.05** -0.05** -0.04 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Log (GDP per capita difference) -0.15*** -0.27***
(0.02) (0.02)
Log (Trade openess) 0.29*** 0.45***
(0.05) (0.07)
_cons -5.35*** -4.42*** -4.42*** -4.69***
(0.09) (0.45) (0.44) (0.56)
ln_p 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.91***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 15166 15166 15166 15022 15166 15166 15166 15022
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in country pairs) ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01: where Conflict denote Dummy variable=1
if two countries have had conflict history) , Contiguity refers dummy variable=1 if two countries share common border; Commmon ethnographic
language =1 if two countries share common ethnic language (at least 9% of the population; Colonial relationship =1 if two countries ever had colonial
link; Common colonizer post 1945=1 if two countries have had common colonizer after 1945; Colonial relationship post 1945=1 if two countries have
had colonial relationship after 1945: Log of bilateral distance refers Log of Weighted bilateral distance between country pairs; EU=1 if EU is involved;
WTO =1 if one of the country pair is WTO member; War frequency refers the number of bilateral conflict between country pairs; 1/Peaceful year(The
reciprocal of peaceful years between the end of last war and the start of trade negotiation); total duration of war (Duration of war in years); log (Gdp
per capita difference) refers GDP per capita difference b/n country pairs (log form) ; Log (Trade Openess)refers Log of trade openness (the ratio of
country pairs average trade to GDP).
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Table 2.7: Duration between: Start-end of negotiation: (Only if EU is involved)
Cox Proportional Hazard Model Weibull Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.05 0.21
(0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.20)
Common ethnographic language -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Contiguity -0.11 -0.09 -0.03 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Colonial relatioship -0.68** -0.63** -0.46 -0.70** -0.64** -0.47
(0.32) (0.29) (0.37) (0.32) (0.29) (0.34)
Common colonizer post 1945 -0.13 -0.13 -0.16 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Colonial relationship post 1945 -1.18 -1.23 -1.39 -1.39 -1.39 -1.51
(1.09) (1.09) (1.13) (1.22) (1.21) (1.26)
Log of bilateral distance -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Bilateral 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.47** 0.49** 0.45**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23)
WTO -0.01 0.03 0.15 -0.05 0.00 0.18
(0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.23)
War frequency -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
(1/peacefull year) 0.01 -0.21 0.00 -0.27
(0.00) (1.25) (0.01) (1.31)
total duration of in war 0.04*** 0.04** 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Log (GDP per capita difference) 0.00 -0.03
(0.04) (0.05)
Log(Trade openess) 0.27** 0.31*
(0.12) (0.17)
_cons -2.93*** -2.89*** -2.76*** -4.67***
(0.10) (0.78) (0.79) (1.21)
ln_p 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.50***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
N 2023 2023 2023 1945 2023 2023 2023 1945
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in country pairs) ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01: where Conflict denote Dummy variable=1
if two countries have had conflict history) , Contiguity refers dummy variable=1 if two countries share common border; Commmon ethnographic
language =1 if two countries share common ethnic language (at least 9% of the population; Colonial relationship =1 if two countries ever had
colonial link; Common colonizer post 1945=1 if two countries have had common colonizer after 1945; Colonial relationship post 1945=1 if two
countries have had colonial relationship after 1945: Log of bilateral distance refers Log of Weighted bilateral distance between country pairs; EU=1
if EU is involved; WTO =1 if one of the country pair is WTO member; War frequency refers the number of bilateral conflict between country pairs;
1/Peaceful year(The reciprocal of peaceful years between the end of last war and the start of trade negotiation); total duration of war (Duration of
war in years); log (Gdp per capita difference) refers GDP per capita difference b/n country pairs (log form) ; Log (Trade Openess)refers Log of
trade openness (the ratio of country pairs average trade to GDP).
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Table 2.8: Robustness Checks
Cox Proportional Hazard Model Weibul model
Conflict (Main) Conflict(Strict) Conflict (Recent) Conflict(Main) Conflict(Strict) Conflict(Recent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict 0.52*** 0.42*** 0.19 0.67*** 0.56*** 0.20
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
Common ethnographic language 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.06
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Contiguity 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.11
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Colonial relationship 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.14
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23)
Common colonizer post 1945 -0.24*** -0.22** -0.24*** -0.25** -0.22* -0.25**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Colonial relationship post 1945 -0.36 -0.39 -0.43* -0.35 -0.38 -0.45
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27)
Log of bilateral distance 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
EU 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.41* 0.42* 0.54**
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
WTO 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.26** 0.26** 0.26**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
War Frequency -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04** -0.03** -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(1/peacefull year) 0.10 0.25 0.36 -0.17 0.02 0.21
(0.96) (0.79) (0.77) (1.20) (0.97) (0.89)
Total duration in war 0.03** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Log(GDP per capita difference) -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.16***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log (Trade openess) 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.26***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Duration from initation to start -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.26***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
log number of participant -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.57*** -0.60*** -0.61*** -0.67***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
_cons -2.75*** -2.50*** -2.09***
(0.48) (0.47) (0.46)
/
ln_p 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.86***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
N 16790 16790 16790 16790 16790 16790
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in country pairs) ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01: where Conflict denote Dummy variable=1 if two countries have
had conflict history) , Contiguity refers dummy variable=1 if two countries share common border; comlang_ethno =1 if two countries share common ethnic language (at least
9% of the population; colony =1 if two countries ever had colonial link; Common colon=1 if two countries have had common colonizer after 1945; col45=1 if two countries
have had colonial relationship after 1945: Ldist refers Log of Weighted bilateral distance between country pairs; EU=1 if EU is involved; WTO =1 if one of the country pair is
WTO member; Frequency refers the number of bilateral conflict between country pairs; 1/Peaceful year(The reciprocal of peaceful years between the end of last war and the
start of trade negotiation); War duration (Duration of war in years); lgGdp_diffb refers GDP per capita difference b/n country pairs (log form) ; Log_Openess refers Log of trade
openness (the ratio of country pairs average trade to GDP), Duration from initiation to start of negotation is the period between initial anouncement to the start of negotation and
number of participant refers the total number of participant countries in the negotiation table .
2.6 Conclusion
Economic integration and peace creation is the center of agenda during trade ne-
gotiation. The motive of forming regional trade agreements (RTAs) has a direct
implication on the complexity of the negotiation process and hence duration.
Durations from the start of the negotiations through the end differs consider-
ably. Our main result shows that trade negotiations concluded faster for those
country pairs who ever had conflict than who never had. After controlling set
of explanatory variables, we found that duration of trade negotiation for country
pairs involved in historical conflict takes from 1.6 to 2 times faster than those
countries who never had conflict history. That is from the average duration of
about 8 years, duration of trade negation for conflicting country pairs takes from
3 to 4 years faster than country pairs who never had conflict history. Our result
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is more robust to number of sensitivity checks particularly using broad and strict
definition of conflict variable from the correlates of war. Apart from the conflict
variable; trade openness, involvement of WTO member in the trade negotiation
concluded faster. On the contrary Involvement of EU members in the negotia-
tion, bilateral distance, log GDP per capita difference between members results
the negotiation process to take long. In this paper, we made two major contri-
butions; First, we estimate the magnitude of the effect of conflict on duration of
trade negotiation that will be more helpful for firms’ investment decision. Sec-
ond, uncover the role of politics in the process of trade negotiation. Though this
paper gives a benchmark study about the impact of past history of conflict on
today’s negotiation; there is potential future research work to see about history
of conflict and cooperation and spillover effects of parallel trade deals on other
negotiation process ; from initiation to enforcement process.
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CHAPTER 3. NORTH–SOUTH TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND AGRICULTURAL INPUT USE
3.1 Introduction
The promotion of trade liberalization as a key component of development strate-
gies has been taken place in many countries. Countries are taking liberalization
measures since liberalization will create greater efficiency in resource alloca-
tion, specialization in production, knowledge and technological spillovers, and
competition, and hence promote economic growth and development.
Growth in agricultural productivity has been a central issue for insuring an in-
creasing food demand from growing population. There is a growing evidence;
both theoretical and empirical, about the role of agricultural productivity on eco-
nomic growth (Gollin, D.2010). Among the four channels where agriculture
contributes to growth summarized by Kuznets (1968), the backward and forward
linkage to the manufacturing industry is the main one. In the forward linkage
agriculture provides raw materials to the manufactured sector and hence gets
manufactured inputs back from the industrial sector. For example, MaArthur &
McCord, (2017) investigated how the use of manufactured input for agriculture
improves the agricultural productivity growth and hence facilitate the process
of structural change. In their work, they showed that the use of fertilizer boosts
agricultural yields and economic growth.
Though, the use of manufactured inputs to agriculture such as fertilizer and agri-
cultural machinery are acknowledged in the literature, consumption of such in-
puts for agricultural production varies significantly across countries, which im-
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plies poor link between the manufacturing and agricultural sector. In most devel-
oping countries, where the manufacturing sector is not yet developed, this link-
age is yet so weak and in-turn the agricultural sector is not yet developed. Thus,
one can argue that any economic integration such as Regional Trade Agreements
(RTAs now onwards) between manufacturing country and agricultural country
can bring productivity growth in both countries by improving input mixes at
their optimal level.
The existence of huge variation in agricultural input use across counties and its
link to countries participation to regional trade agreement follows from two main
motivations. First, if RTAs are among similar countries such as south-south
RTAs, technological spillover is so low and hence, RTAs among agricultural
countries might have little impact on the pattern of agricultural input use. Sec-
ond, if RTAs is among differentiated countries, it will enhance complementary
effect. That is an RTA between technologically advanced economy and tradi-
tional agrarian economy might enhance improved agricultural input use.
We test the above prediction by using data on agricultural input use for 66 devel-
oping countries from the period 1980 to 2015. We employ two different econo-
metric strategy to examine the causal relationship between manufactured aids of
agricultural production and regional trade agreement. In our first approach, we
estimate the fertilizer and agricultural machinery use by pooling all other cross
sectional units and run OLS estimation. We control for set of variables such
as population, agricultural land, GDP per capita, agricultural value added and
country and year fixed effects. In our second approach, we employ instrumental
variable(IV) approach for RTA membership to examine the causal link between
agricultural input use and RTA membership. Hence, we found that, countries
participation to RTAs increases the use of agricultural input. Moreover, the ef-
fect of RTAs participation is much larger for those countries who have RTAs
with developed countries. Our result confirms the prediction of backward link-
age where the manufactured sector produces manufactured aids for agricultural
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production and feeds the agricultural sector; the linkage is between countries
in this case, where countries’ integration facilitates factor movement and hence
productivity gain. Our result suggests that relative to those countries who do not
have RTAs with high income countries, those countries who have such RTAs
uses about 5.7 kg/ha more of fertilizer which has huge implication to agricultural
yield gain as predicted by MaArthur & McCord, (2017). MaArthur & McCord,
(2017) estimated that a 0.8 kg/ha increase in the use of fertilizer results an in-
crease in yield by 7kg/ha. Similarly, developing countries participation of RTAs
with the developed country is associated with use of about 14 more machinery
per 100 square kilometers of arable land.
Previous studies on the area also showed qualitatively similar results. For ex-
ample, a study by Ahmed, (1995) showed that liberalization of the agricultural
input market has resulted a remarkable increase in adoption of new technologies
such as fertilizer, power-driven equipment, high yield variety seeds, and pes-
ticides in Bangladesh. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
has increased fertilizer use in Mexico and pesticide use in the United states (P.
Williams, & C. Shumway, 2000).
3.2 Theoretical Motivation
For a simple agricultural production function y=f(Land, Labor, K) where K is
all manufactured aids of agricultural production (fertilizer, agri-machinery and
tractors ), employment of any one of this inputs below the optimal amount forces
the other input to be used above the optimal level where marginal productivity
is less. In most developing countries where labor and land is in a relative abun-
dance, capital input is scarce. Hence, any mechanism that brings capital use
convenient might affect factor input mixes in a more productive way and hence
output growth.
Assume country i is small country (no influence on international price for agri-
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cultural input). A small country has relatively inelastic supply curve for agri-
cultural inputs due to capacity constraint. Figure 1, shows the theoretical link
between trade liberalization and demand for fertilizer in panel A and fertilizer
use and yield in panel B. This paper is thus a modest attempt to empirical show
the theoretical link in panel A.
Let the representative producer production function be:
maxY = ALαKβN θ (3.1)
subject to wL+ rK +RN ≤ C
where Y is agricultural yield , L is labor, K is capital and N is land. w,r and R
are respectively, price of labor, price of capital and price of land.
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FOC:
αALα−1KβN θ = 0 (3.2)
βALαKβ−1N θ = 0
θALαKβN θ−1 = 0
Solving the three equations simultaneously:
L∗ =
αC
w [α + β + θ]
(3.3)
K∗ =
βC
r [α + β + θ]
N∗ = θC
R [α + β + θ]
For a constant return to scale(CRS), L∗ = αC
w
, K∗ = βC
r
, , N∗ = θC
R
,
Thus, Y ∗ = AL∗αK∗βN∗θ = A
(
α
w
)α (β
r
)β ( θ
R
)θ
C
Assume K is the only tradable input across countries: Hence, for the country
who imports the capital input, the price of capital r=r*+t. where t is per unit
tariff for capital inputs.
dK∗
dt
=
dK∗
dr
dr
dt
= −βC
r2
< 0 (3.4)
dY
dt
=
dY
dr
dr
dt
< 0
This model predicts that any trade policy that reduces tariff such as free trade
agreement increases the use of capital inputs in the agricultural sector and here
by agricultural production.
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3.3 Overview of Countries Participation to RTAs
And Agricultural Input Use
Despite low participation of developing countries to RTAs, every country is a
member of at least one RTA. Most of the RTAs that developing countries par-
ticipate are mainly South-South RTA where it is characterized by poor imple-
mentation and weaker link to the process of industrialization and yet there is an
increasing trends of South-South RTA as compared to North-South RTAs (Di-
caprio, Santos-Paulino, & Sokolova, 2017). This model predicts that any trade
policy that reduces tariff such as free trade agreement increases the use of capital
inputs in the agricultural sector and here by agricultural production.
3.4 Overview of Countries Participation to RTAs
And Agricultural Input Use
Despite low participation of developing countries to RTAs, every country is a
member of at least one RTA. Most of the RTAs that developing countries par-
ticipate are mainly South-South RTA where it is characterized by poor imple-
mentation and weaker link to the process of industrialization and yet there is an
increasing trends of South-South RTA as compared to North-South RTAs (Di-
caprio, Santos-Paulino, & Sokolova, 2017). As it is clearly shown in figure 2,
RTA participation is much higher in the South-East Asia, Europe, North Amer-
ica and some part of Latin America. Surprisingly, such variation is also reflected
in countries level of growth and moreover agricultural input use. Figure 3 shows
the variations in fertilizer use across regions. The time series data of the trend
in fertilizer use generally shows an increasing trend which off course coincides
with the proliferation of RTAs in the early 1980s and high jump is observed after
1990s. For example, Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) was a pref-
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erential trade agreement among developing countries and some middle income
developing countries that come into effect in the late 1980s.
3.4.1 Agricultural input and Yield
The use of improved seeds, fertilizers and other agronomy technologies has been
mentioned in the literature as the driving force for the 1960s Green revolution
in Asia (Hazell, 2009). A field experiments by Yousaf et al., (2017), in china
showed the effect of fertilizer on agricultural yield; application of fertilizers en-
hanced crop yields by 19-41% for rice and from 61-76 % for rapeseeds. Simi-
larly, a field experiment in Kenya by Duflo, et al. (2008) presented that the use
of most profitable quantity of fertilizer results a 36 percent increase in the mean
rate of return over a season, implying that there is 69.5 percent increase in rate of
return on an annualized basis. Similarly by exploiting the global distribution of
fertilizer production and associated differences in transportation distance across
countries as a source of exogenous variation, McArthur & McCord, (2017) found
that the use of improved inputs such as fertilizer results a huge productivity gain
in the agricultural output. Figure 4 and 5 shows a simple correlation between
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fertilizer use per hectare and yield as well as the use of agricultural machinery
and yield respectively for our sample.
3.5 Data and Identification strategies
3.5.1 Data
Data for this study is mainly from FAOSTAT where the estimation strategy is
drawn based on a cross country data over repeated time. But the data setting
deviates from the standard panel data structures because in this dataset there is
repeated time for the same cross sectional units. In other words, a given cross
sectional unit can be matched with more than one cross sectional unit at a time
which resulted repeated time for same unit. Hence, we take in to account this in
our estimation strategy. In our analysis, we consider the time span from 1980
to 2015. But the time series data for our key outcome variable is not uniformly
available for those years. For example, fertilizer use per hectare is available
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in two different measurements according to the FAOSTAT data. From 1961 to
2001, they use different measurement and from 2002 to 2015 they use differ-
ent measurement and yet the harmonization is not done. Hence, to avoid any
bias associated with such different measurement, we relay estimation of fertil-
izer use after 2002. For agricultural machinery use data is available before 2009.
Therefore, in this paper we estimate the fertilizer use and agricultural machin-
ery use in a separate analysis. Fertilizer consumption is defined as it defined
in WDI(2018) which “measures the quantity of plant nutrients used per unit of
arable land. Fertilizer products cover nitrogenous, potash, and phosphate fer-
tilizers (including ground rock phosphate)”. Traditional nutrients–animal and
plant manures–are not included according to FAO. Thus, Fertilizer consump-
tion (kilograms per hectare of arable land) is used in the analysis. Regarding
agricultural machinery WB- WDI (2018) defined and recorded as the number of
agricultural machinery and tractors per 100 sq. km of agricultural land which
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can be arable.
The key independent variable is whether a given country is participated in any
RTAs at time t. Thus, we use a country pair data over long period of time.
Data for such gravity variables comes from the WTO and the Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’lnformations Internationales (CEPII) database. For capturing
the effect of North-south RTA, we create an interaction term explaining whether
RTAs is between developing country and high income country (High Income
RTA: we use the world development indicator’s classification of income group
of countries , and with EU only (RTA_EU). Other controls include, Agricultural
land (share of land that is arable), log of GDP per capita pp adjusted 2011 con-
stant price, Population and log of agricultural value added. All this data comes
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator(WDI, 2018).
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3.5.2 Strategy
Our interest is assessing whether country i’s agricultural input use is affected by
any trade policy measures (specifically RTA membership status).￿
Inputit = αi + βRTAijt + θRTAijt ·Northj +X ′γ + ηt + ϵit (3.5)
Where Inputit is use of country i’s manufactured aids of agricultural production
at time t. RTAijtis a dummy variable equal to 1 if country i and j have RTA at
time t. The interaction variable is a dummy variable whether the RTA is among
developed country or not; X is set of control variable such as agricultural land,
log of GDP per capita, population, and log of agricultural value added. αi and
ηt are country specific fixed and year fixed effects respectively. Finally, ϵit is
common idiosyncratic error term.
3.5.3 Instrumenting for membership to RTAs
One might have difficulty to accept the estimates of RTA membership and agri-
cultural input use as causal link. Omitted variable bias might be a problem here
that makes our key explanatory variable to be endogenous. We use an instrumen-
tal variable approach to identify the causal link. Many historians and political
scientists believe that the driving force of the establishment of European Coal
and still Community(ECSC) in 1951 was mainly to solidify peace so as to avoid
other destructive conflicts that has been seen in the major world wars. Martin et
al. (2012) showed that there is high probability for country pairs to have RTA
if they have had higher frequency of historical war. Hence, we use history of
bilateral conflict as an instrument for formation of RTAs between country pairs.
We believe that past history of conflict between county pairs has no direct im-
pact on current utilization of agriculture input. Since the purpose of our paper is
to disentangle the impact of RTA with high income countries from the general
RTA, we use additional instrument to identify the second endogenous variable.
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The second instrument is motivated by the domino theory of regionalism– for-
mation of regional integration between countries harms the non-members trade
and hence triggers them to be pro-membership activity (Baldwin, 1993). Costas
et al. (2016) used this domino theory of regionalism as an instrument for forma-
tion of RTA. In their paper they used the number of Free Trade Areas(FTAs) and
number of Custom union(CU) agreements signed between country pairs and the
rest of the world as an instrument. In our paper we deviate slightly from Costas
et al. (2016) approach by excluding the number of RTAs signed by the coun-
try that we are studding for. This approach will help us to reduce the risk of
non fulfilment of the exclusion restriction. In other words the number of RTAs
signed by country i directly affects country i’s agriculture input use. Hence we
exclude this part and consider only the number of country j’s signed RTAs as an
instrument for formation of RTAs between country i and j.
RTAijt = δi + φ1Conflictij + φ2Num_RTAj +X ′ϕ+ τt + ξit (3.6)
Where set of controls, country specific and year specific countries are defined
above, Conflictij is a dummy variable 1 if country pairs have had conflict,
Num_RTAj is number of RTAs signed by country j with the rest of the world.
3.6 Empirical Result
3.6.1 Descriptive statistics
We start to analyze our estimation result by presenting the general picture of
the data used in our paper. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics result of
the main variables used. For the sample of 66 developing countries used in the
paper, their average fertilizer consumption is about 119.5 kg/ hectare where as
the number of agricultural machinery used is about 34 per 100 square kilometers
of arable land. The use of fertilizer across countries varies significantly. For
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example in our sample for the period between 2002 and 2015 fertilizer use varies
from a minimum of less than 1 kilogram per hectare in most sub Saharan country
to more than 1000 kilograms per hectare in south eastern Asian countries .This
variation is of course reflected in terms of economic integration through regional
trade agreements. Sub Saharan African countries are the less integrated with
high income countries; from the total of RTAs they have only 6.08 percent are
with high income countries. Whereas East Asia & Pacific countries are relatively
integrated through trade agreements; from the total RTAs they have about 36
percent is with high income countries.
Table 2 presents the pooled OLS result after controlling country and year fixed
effects. The dependent variable in all of the columns is the log of fertilizer use per
hectare for the period 2002 to 2015. Our key variable is the dummy variable RTA
equal 1 if country has RTAs in force. For the purpose of examining north-south
RTAs effect , we create interaction between RTA and whether the partner country
is high income country or not. The coefficient on RTA is about 0.10 and strongly
significant. After controlling other factors including country and year specific
factors, countries who have RTA, there fertilizer consumption per hectare is 10
percent higher than those who don’t have. In column 1 and 2 we added the
interaction between RTA and whether the partner country is European union(EU)
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member or not; the result confirmed that, having RTA with EU member country
is associated with consumption of more fertilizers compared with others who do
not have RTA with EU. To address the North—South RTA, in column 3 and 4
we use the interaction between RTA and all high income trading partner as a key
variable for our research question. The coefficient on High Income_RTA, which
represents the North—South RTA, is 0.04 and statistically significant. Finally,
we report the result which includes the upper middle income and high income
countries in column 5 and 6. Though, the magnitude marginally declines as it is
expected, the result is qualitatively similar.
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3.6.2 Instrumenting RTA and its Interactions
In order to confirm the estimate that we present in table 2 is causal estimate,
we employ instrumental variable approach. Table 3, presents the results from
the two stage least square estimates(2SLS). Column 1 , 2 and 3 repeats the re-
sult of column 2,4 and 6 of table 2 but using instrumental variable(IV) for RTA
and the interaction terms of RTA. From column 1 through three, we use conflict
history as an IV for RTA and the number of RTAs signed by partner country
with the rest of the world as an IV for each respected interactions of RTA. The
coefficient for RTA in column 1 and 2 is consistent with what we found in the re-
spective column of table 2. And fertilizer consumption per hectare for countries’
having RTA with either EU countries or high-income countries is 8 percent and
11 percent higher than those who do not have respectively. Column 3 presents
the result for RTAs with high and upper middle income countries—the RTA be-
come insignificant, whereas the coefficient for RTA with high and upper middle
income is 0.16 and statistically significant. Thus our instrumental variable ap-
proach revealed that most of the effect of RTA comes from an RTA with high
and upper middle income; implying RTAs with low and lower middle income
countries have negligible impact on fertilizer use. Apart from the RTA variables,
GDP per capita, population and agricultural value add which represents the rela-
tive importance of agricultural sector in the economy, are associated with higher
consumption of fertilizer. Whereas agricultural land has negative and signifi-
cant coefficient. The implication of the negative sign in the agricultural land
size can possibly be, countries who have large agricultural land, practices exten-
sive farming than intensive and technology based farming system. To maintain
the fertility of the land, farmers usually use the practice of shifting cultivation
and fallowing system. But this practice is common where farmers have better
access for agricultural land. For example a study on Peruvian amazon, Coomes
et al. (2000) shows that relative to those households who have less acess to land,
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households with better access to land uses fallowing system for longer time.
Table 4, Presents the estimated results for agricultural machinery use. Covering
from 1980 to 2009, the impact of having an RTA with any country is positive and
statistically significant. For example, the estimated coefficient for having RTAs
with high income countries in column 4 is 0.94 and it is statistically significant;
relative to those countries who do not have RTAs with high income countries,
agricultural machinery use is more than 100 percent higher for those who have
RTAs with high income countries. Similar to fertilizer use, we instrument RTAs
with conflict and number of RTAs signed by the partner country with the rest of
the world and reported in table 5. The result confirmed similar and more strong
evidences for the causal link between countries RAT with high income country
and agricultural machinery use.
On table 6, we report the robustness check for our benchmark regression for
both dependent variables. We believe that legacy history of colonial relationship
still observed in terms of economic integration and development cooperation.
Hence, we use colonial link as an additional exogenous variation for overidenti-
fication test and checking the robustness of our baseline result. The result from
column 1, shows that our result is consistent with our main result of table 2 and
3. Similar result is observed in column 3 for agricultural machinery use. Finally,
the p-value for our over-identification test confirmed that, our instruments are
indeed exogenous.
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In Table 7, we examine the channel through which the response in agricul-
ture input is observed following countries RTA membership with high income
countries. Because of data availability I did three exercises for fertilizer from
column 1 to 3 and only one exercise for agricultural machinery. When countries
sign an RTA with developed country, there might be an increase in both demand
for agricultural output by country’s RTA partner and hence an increase in de-
mand for agricultural input. In other words, the increase in agricultural input
use following formation of RTA might be either through an increase demand for
agricultural output by RTA partner or through increase in access for factor mar-
kets. To identify that, in column 1 we control for an interaction term between
RTA and import demand for agricultural output by the country’s RTA partner.
The coefficient for import demand for agricultural output by RTA partner in col-
umn 1 is zero and our coefficient of interest is consistent with the benchmark
result. Column 2 and 3, is an RTA with net exporter of fertilizer. In all of the
exercises the result holds. Finally in column 4, we did for agricultural machin-
ery use by controlling RTA partner’s demand for agricultural output. The result
confirmed that an RTA with high income country still holds. Moreover, agri-
cultural output demand by RTA partner has positive and significant impact on
agricultural machinery use.
In our main result of table 3 and 5 we have shown that when we control
for RTA with upper middle income and high income country , the coefficient
for RTA alone becomes insignificant. Implying RTA between both low income
countries have no impact on our outcome variable.
In table 8, we did a falsification test. Our falsification test follows from the
argument that; if the claim that developing countries have RTAs with high in-
come countries, there will be a technology transfer from advanced countries to
developing countries explained by the use of improved inputs for agriculture.
If the above claim is true, the impact of having RTA with developing will not
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have any impact on fertilizer and agricultural machinery use by developed coun-
tries. Thus, For fertilizer use and agricultural input use, we estimate high income
countries agricultural input use on having an RTA with low income countries.
The result for both inputs coefficients are statistically zero. The implication of
such result is thus, developing countries exposure to the international market
through RTA with high income countries have significant spillover effect on use
of manufactured aids of production for agricultural sector..
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3.7 Conclusion
In our analysis, we documented that countries having RTA uses more fertilizer
and agricultural machinery per units of arable land. Moreover, our paper showed
a strong links between regional trade agreement with high income countries– and
fertilizer use as well as agricultural machinery use after controlling country and
year specific factors. We employ both pooled OLS with country and year fixed
effects as well us instrumental variable approach to present the causal link be-
tween the variable of interest. We use theory driven instruments such as conflict
and domino (number of RTAs partner country have with the rest of the world) to
identify our factor demand equation so that to produce causal link. From table
2, through table 6, our result confirms that countries who have RTAs use more
agricultural inputs which has a great implication on yield and structural change
as it is posited by McArthur & McCord, (2017). This result gives a hint that the
role of economic integration with heterogenous countries in terms of economic
activity has a complimentary effect for the domestic economy for the process
of structural transformation. Hence, in signing an RTAs, identifying domestic
production gaps and finding a trading partner who can fill that gap either in in
transfer of production technology and filling the short run consumption demand
should due attention.
We believe this paper is a starting point to explore the link between agricultural
input and trade integration. In the future more robust result can be found if we
add gricultural output and overall structural transformation for the economy in
relation to trade integration by considering a detailed evidences on factors af-
fecting agricultural activity.
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